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In the decade since the Great Recession, various contract scholars have
observed that one reason the financial crisis was so "great" was due in part to
contract law-or, more precisely, the failures of contract law for not curbing the
risky lending practices in the American housing market. However, there is
another reason why contracts made that recession so great: contracts furthered
inequality. In recent years, when economic inequality has become a dominant
national conversation topic, we can see development of that inequality in the
Great Recession. And indeed, contract law was complicit. While contractual
flexibility and innovation were available to soften the blow of large commercial
deals gone wrong during the crisis, residential mortgage defaults across the U.S.
were subject to strict contractual formalism that led to severe consequences for
those pursuing one of the hallmark prizes of the American Dream,
homeownership. Specifically, mortgage default cases during the Great Recession
featured commercial parties relying on the gravity of the Great Recession as the
reason why their contract breaches ought to be excused through doctrines such
as impracticability. Although impracticability defenses premised on economic
changes are usually unconvincing, commercial claimants during the Great
Recession had some surprising successes and advantages in taking such
positions-including real estate mogul Donald Trump and his firm when they
defaulted on a $640 million real estate loan with lender Deustche Bank.
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of homeowners, whose abilities to honor their
mortgage agreements were also hindered by the economic downturn, could not
predicate their defaults on the crisis and get away with it. Instead, they were
subject to rigid contract formalism. The entitlement to flexible and innovative
excuse arguments seemed particularly exclusive to commercial claimants during
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the Great Recession. And contract law helped sustain that exclusivity. Therein
lies the inequality.
This Article 's ultimate goal is not to argue, like others already have, for
the efficacy of expanding contract excuse doctrines in significant times of crisis.
Instead, the heart of this Article 's investigation examines, using the example of
impracticability arguments used during the Great Recession, why commercial
parties had more access to flexibility in contracts than others in order to point
out how it resonates societally for contracts. Modern contract law furthered
inequality when it could have been more instrumental in advancing social
mobility and economic opportunity. Thus, this Article 's observations ultimately
support the idea that rather than formalism, contract pluralism ought to be
adopted in order to give contracts a more meaningful role in furthering afair and
just society.
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Why Flexibility Matters
I. INTRODUCTION
A decade's time has passed since the crash of the American housing
market and the rise of the ensuing financial crisis-the oft-referenced "Great
Recession." Precipitated in large part by the balloon and bust of artificial
housing prices of the mid-2000s, 2 the reasons why financial experts worldwide
bestowed the title of "greatness" on this particular recession likely had to do with
several of its peculiar dimensions. On the surface, the immensity of the failure
was staggering both at the ground-level, with risky behavior in the home
financing market, and at higher levels as such behavior was incorporated
precariously into the investment innovations based off home lending.3 In between
the litany of specifics was a narrative of horribles-inherent vices for economic
disaster: subprime and predatory lending,4 faulty collateralized debt,5 defaults and
foreclosures,6 the bursting of inflated housing markets, and banks that eventually
needed to be bailed out.8 Then, of course, beyond the news headlines, there were
1 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, 'Great Recession': A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2009), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/1 1/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/?_r-0
(noting in 2009 that "[t]he title 'The Great Recession' seems to be gaining some currency"); see
also Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Ryan Nunn, Lauren Bauer, David Boddy, & Greg Nantz,
Nine Facts about the Great Recession and the Tools for Fighting the Next Downturn, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (May 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/fiscalfacts.pdf. [hereinafter Nine Facts] (referring to the financial crisis
that happened between December 2007 and June 2009 as the Great Recession). The authors here
go on to compare history the Great Recession with four most recent recessions to illustrate the
gravity of the crisis. Id.
2 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing A Financial Crisis: Reflections
on in Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &
DEV. L.J. 113, 115 (2010) (listing the "bubble in housing prices in the United States" as one of the
causes for the financial crisis).
3 See Chad J. Pomeroy, Well Enough Alone: Liability for Wrongful Foreclosure, 68 ALA. L. REV.
943, 950 (2017) (footnotes omitted) ("The front end of the financial crisis, as broadly described
above, is strongly associated with poor lending practices and the system that built up around those
practices. The banks caused themselves (and, eventually, the entire global economic community)
enormous harm by investing in debtors who were unlikely to repay and by building a significant
part of their capital structure around those investments."); see id. at 951 (footnotes omitted)
("[D]uring the run-up to the Great Recession, banks packaged together their subprime loans into
mortgage-backed securities and sold them to investors all over the world.").
See Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had A Financial Crisis, FORBES.COM (Nov. 22,
2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/#7354 1f59f92f.
See Adam Davidson, How Wall Street Made The Mortgage Crisis Worse, NPR (Aug, 27, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2010/08/26/129454550/inside-the-sausage-factory-how-wall-
street-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.
6 See P. Gupta, The American Dream Deferred: Contextualizing Property After the Foreclosure
Crisis, 73 MD. L. REV. 523 (2014).
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 14 (2009).
8 Id. at 77.
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the ripple effects-first with domestic events, such as the rise of unemployment,9
decrease in spending and retail,10 and loss of wealth in the middle-class." Then
the ripple expanded globally, contributing, for example, to the slowdown of
national economies in North and South America, Europe, Asia, the MViddle East,
and parts of Africa. 12 Thus, convincingly, the description of "greatness" placed on
this recession was not hyperbolic. Had this recession been visible on a weather
map, its stormy, cumulonimbus mass would have enveloped an economic
landscape nearly as vast as the globe. Indeed, as the economic community
regarded the forecast as beyond dim, any shelter from the harms of the Great
Recession soon disappeared or very quickly became scarce. Not only had the
crisis literally and figuratively torn the roofs off those living within the pursuit of
homeownership, but world-wide the effects were similar with no safety in sight.13
It is no wonder that then Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, had
similarly likened this recession to a "once-in-a-lifetime credit tsunami" in a
testimony before Congress in 2008.14
Since then, the economy of the twenty-first century has been
recovering"-albeit slowly, 16 and with some observers, for a while, even
controverting whether the crisis has really ended. 17 Still unresolved, however, is
the bigger question concerning whether, economics aside, we have truly sobered
9 Id. at 76.
10 Id. at 72.
n Jim Tankersley, Why America's Middle Class is Lost, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2014/12/12/why-americas-middle-class-is-
lost/?utm term=. 19362d3282d5.
12 E.g., Nouriel Roubini, A Global Breakdown ofRecession of 2009, FORBES.COM (Jan. 15, 2009),
https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/14/global-recession-2009-oped-cx nr 0115roubini.html (citing
effects of the Great Recession in each of the different regions in the world).
13 See id.
14 NPR, Greenspan Calls Financial Crisis 'A Credit Tsunami, 'NPR (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=96023610.
1 See, e.g., Eswar Prasad & Karim Foda, The Global Economic Recovery Is for Real: Advanced
Economies Are Settling into Reasonable Growth as Emerging Markets Rebound, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/27bd72c8-2121-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229
c?mhq5j=e2.
16 See Nine Facts, supra, note 1, at 1 ("Not only was the Great Recession ... deeper than any
recent recession, but it took nearly four years for the economy to regain the prerecession GDP
level twice as long as for the 1981-82 recession."); see also Drew Desilver, Five Years In,
Recovery Still Underwhelms Compared with Previous Ones, Pew Research Center (June 23, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/23/five-years-in-recovery-still-underwhelms-
compared-with-previous-ones ("[T]he current recovery is among the weakest on record,
particularly given its duration.").
17 See, e.g., Josh Barro, People Think We're in a Recession. Don't Blame Them., N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2014), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/people-think-were-in-a-
recession-dont-blame-them/ (mentioning a result of a NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll in 2014
that found "American adults found that 57 percent still think the economy is in recession.").
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and wised up a decade later. This question appears to be one that remains to be
answered through the politics of our current time. Interestingly, no strong,
vibrant, and hardline consensus has really emerged to quell the query. While
some of the political rhetoric during the post-recession has focused heavily on
economic inequality, no real dynamic political will has proved we ought not to
venture back to the days of risky financial behavior. 19 In fact, the legislative
agenda imposed by congressional conservatives after the 2016 U.S. presidential
elections has been more decisive in undoing some of the regulatory protections
that were enacted after the Great Recession, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of
201020 which restricted risky behavior by financial institutions-of the very type
that had led to the Great Recession.2 1 Ironically, some of the justifications put
forth for undoing the Dodd-Frank Act have been that such regulations have
prohibited post-recession growth of financial institutions.22
If one were to step back into the wreckage that represents the Great
Recession and look at what exists underneath the collapsed structure of events-
to lift up the figurative equivalence of fallen beams, cracked drywall, twisted
broken glass, and metal in the failed transactions, practices, and innovations of
parties (large financial institutions and millions of homeowners alike)-that
archeology would be sobering. But doctrinally, we ought not to be surprised by
what we would find either. Beneath the subprime lending, the buying and selling
of homes, the mortgage-backed securities, the trading and eventual trenching of
those securities, the defaults and foreclosures, the burst of the housing bubble,
and the bailouts, we would discover something all-too familiar and perhaps
slightly overlooked: We would find contracts amidst the rubble. After all, it was
the use of contracts that facilitated lending,23 helped securitize debt amongst
18 For instance, going into the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, income inequality and wealth
distribution was a major campaign platform. See, e.g., David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges
as Key Issue in 2016 Presidential Campaign, L.A. Times (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.
com/nation/1a-na-campaign-income-20150205-story.html.
19 Accord Justin Wolfers, The Economy May Be Stuck in a Near-Zero World, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/upshot/the-economy-may-be-stuck-in-a-near-zero-
world.html?_r-0 (urging the shift away from monetary changes at the Federal Reserve toward
"reviv[ing] a more active role for fiscal policy government spending and taxation-so that the
government fills in for the missing stimulus when the Fed can't cut rates any longer.").
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010).
21 Rachel Witkowski, House Panel Approves Plan to Undo Parts of Dodd-Frank Financial Law,
THE WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-panel-approves-plan-to-undo-
parts-of-dodd-frank-financial-law- 1493916205.
22 Id.
23 See Celeste M. Hammond & Ilaria Landini, The Global Subprime Crisis as Explained by the
Contrast Between American Contracts Law and Civil Law Countries' Laws, Practices, and
Expectations in Real Estate Transactions, 11 J. OF INT'L BUSINESS & L. 133 (2012).
Ed 1] 39
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banks, 2 4 and later enforced foreclosures. 25 Contracts lurked in the blueprints,
architectures, and directives of such great failures. But these broken faulty
promises were not, by themselves, the mere culprit or the ultimate cause. Digging
even further beyond contracts, past that layer of sediment, we would find the
animating forces of human behavior that was the instrument for collective
opportunity and failure through contract. Thus, contract law and doctrine leading
up to the economic crisis and then afterwards was a mere instrumentality-but an
important one, no less. On the interpersonal level, contracts fueled human desire
for homeownership-a cornerstone prize of the American Dream 26 -and yet
simultaneously, it buttressed the foundation of what eventually became "too big
to fail." 27 And when events deteriorated for the worst, the mandate of contracts
guided the narrative responses of mass defaults and foreclosures. In a sense,
contracts helped built the faulty house-or housing market-and contracts helped
in the demolition. A cautionary dialectic resides in this narrative, one that reveals
the imposing nature of contracting.
If we point to contract's complicity in the housing crisis, what does it say
about our laws of contracting? That, perhaps, the uses of contract law by the
financial sector in the early to mid-2000s reflect a moralization prompted by free
markets and deregulation, rather than a morality that truly cares about the human
and the interpersonal. And correspondingly, the formalism with which we
presently know and experience in contract law played right into its uses and
abuses at the time.28 For some, that could be the blunt end of any further insight
for contracts in the financial crisis. But there are those who posit that the studies
about the role that contracts had in facilitating the conception, the construction,
and the tear-down of the housing market have not been as extensive as they could
have been. 29 George Cohen has observed that "[a]t the bottom of the financial
24 Id. at 146.
25 See, e.g., Chunlin Leonhard, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Economic Checks and
Balances, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 15, 16 (2012) ("These mortgages were full of
'booby traps and deceptions.' As a result, borrowers entered into costly loan contracts that they
could not actually afford for very long, resulting in defaults and foreclosures that set off the
financial crisis worldwide.") (footnote omitted).
26 Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O'Byrne, Burning Down the House: Law Emotion and the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 677, 685 (2011).
27 See Barney Frank, 'Too Big to Fail'is an Empty Phrase, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 18, 2006),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-bernie-sanders-too-big-to-fail-
banks-201603 18-story.html.
28 Part of that formalism is prompted by our doctrinal regard for contract law as a form of strict
liability. As the Restatement of Contracts (Second) notes, "[c]ontract liability is strict liability....
The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract even if he is without fault and
even if circumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than he had
anticipated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. Note (1981).




crisis lie failed contracts"30 and "[y]et, to date, most discussions of possible
responses to the financial crisis ignore contract law." 31 According to Cohen, the
fact that the resolutions after the burst were more political rather than doctrinal
suggests that some minds had been made up about what to do with contracts in
the financial crisis-a kind of legal futility toward treating contract doctrine in
any innovative way.32 Contrary to that belief, Cohen himself pressed on and so
have others. Likewise, this Article seeks to hone its glance also toward contract
law in the Great Recession rather than ignore it.
If we continue to stand over the ruins of the economic crisis, it is not
unreasonable to surmise, with ample resignation, that contract law was placed
between efficiency and real solutions. But as brutal and imposing contract law
appears to be, it ought to be forgiving as well. In the modem era of American
contract doctrine, the efforts of legal realists in commercial law, the rise of
doctrines promulgated by detrimental reliance and unconscionability, the
influences of equity, and excuse through changed circumstances are all
illustrations of less rigid, less formalist approaches to the rules of contracting.
Contracts can be flexible. In a modern society that is fixated on a liberal project,
contracts can be part of our conception of the good.
This Article's ultimate fixation is on the boundaries of contract law for its
flexibility and innovation-particularly when it came to the missed opportunities
for furthering that flexibility in cases of defaulting homeowners and foreclosures
during the financial crisis. Contract law facilitated opportunity in building the
events that led to the crisis-often in ways that perpetuated illegitimacy within
home mortgage agreements and property ownership. Once the illegitimacy
surfaced, however, contract law, through its enforcement of defaulting loans, also
aided the immediate curtailing of opportunity. But in a recession, that was touted
as so "great," was absolute liability of contracts truly the way to proceed?
Within commercial contract cases in the Great Recession, commercial
parties, unlike residential home loan borrowers, could avert strict contract
enforcement and use arguments for excusing breach in ways that would have
traditionally been prohibited by most courts. Specifically, they relied on the
"greatness" of the Great Recession to make claims that their non-performances in
their existing multi-million dollar deals ought to be excused under the changed
circumstance defenses, such as impracticability. 3 3 One example of such
30 Id. at 1.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1-2 ("Discussions of the crisis tend to say little about contract law, because they simply
assume that the contracts at issue should and will be strictly enforced; given that assumption, there
is not much to say.").
33 See, e.g., Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp.
2d 919, 924 (S.D. Ind. 2008), aff'd but criticized, Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that amongst other reasons, the
Ed 1] 41
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expansion of excusing a contract breach appeared in a commercial case involving
then real estate developer Donald Trump after defaulting on a $640 million
commercial property loan with Deutsche Bank.3 4  Meanwhile, changed
circumstances remained unavailable to the vast majority of homeowners facing
defaults and foreclosures.3 5 Their residential mortgage contracts were subject to
contract formalism.
This Article explores the societal significance of this asymmetry in
contract flexibility and how it contributed to an underlying inequality that is
antithetical to notions of social justice for contract law. Specifically, it will
examine how contracts, rather than fulfilling economic opportunity and self-
determination, facilitated enormous disparity. Its promise, in other words, became
its burden.
After this Part I Introduction, Part II will first establish the narrative of
contracts as to its involvement in the U.S. housing market in the mid-2000s-
specifically its use and function in lending practices that created the bubble in the
housing market prior to the economic crisis, and later in the securitization of
mortgages by financial institutions. Part II will also explore the potential for
flexibility of the contract doctrine after the bubble burst and its missed
opportunities. Then Part III will examine the expansion of the impracticability
doctrine as an example of contract flexibility accessed by large commercial
entities during the Great Recession. After that examination, Part IV will compare
that expansion of impracticability in commercial contracts with the predicament
of underwater homeowners who were not able to rely on excuse doctrines to deal
with defaults. With that comparison, Part IV will observe that the externalities
created by contract enforcement facilitated a vast inequality between wealthy
commercial parties and individual homeowners. Such inequality amount to
dignitary harms that warrant adoption of contract pluralism principles rather than
formalism. Finally, the Article closes with concluding remarks in Part V.
Hopefully, the sentiment becomes clear that perhaps in a modern society
committed to a liberal project, more consideration is needed regarding our present
contract doctrines as part of a conception of the good before the next global
catastrophe arises.
financial crisis "also appears to have made it impossible-or nearly impossible for Hoosier
Energy to find a substitute for Ambac with a sufficient rating, on time, and at any price.").
34 Trump v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 65 A.D.3d 1329 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); see also Trump
v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., Index No. 403012/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
35 See Meredith R. Miller, Strategic Default: The Popularization of a Debate Among Contract
Scholars, 9 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 32, 39 (2011). In her observations of the home loan crisis of
the Great Recession, Miller observes that "the traditional defenses of mistake, fraud and
impracticability or frustration of purpose are not an appropriate doctrinal fit to excuse the
homeowners from paying the loans." Id.
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II. CONTRACTS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS
By design, contract law was utilized at various points both commercially
and residentially throughout the events of the Great Recession. This Part will
track the contractual underpinnings of home mortgage loan agreements and the
contract's crucial role in the subprime market.
A. Traditional Mortgage Financing
Despite the importance of deeds in transferring real estate, contracts also
reside at the heart of the home purchase transactions.3 6 In short, once buyers and
sellers of property memorialize their agreement to purchase, typically these
executory contracts facilitate the roles of both parties in the transactions and
guide them through the various events that must occur before title to property
passes hands.3 7 The purchase and sales contract "defines the parties' rights and
responsibilities with respect to the sale of the real property"38 and helps clarify
"whether the purchase and sale will take place, or whether it will be aborted
because one of many contingencies contained in the contract cannot be met
pursuant to the terms and conditions in the contract."39 Specifically, some of these
events might include verifying the seller's title, conducting satisfactory inspection
of the property, and obtaining financing for the purchase through mortgage.40
Hence, even though the "typical purchase and sale contract is temporally short-
lived-typically lasting 30 to 90 days-it plays an integral part in the disposition
of real property because of its definitional role." 4 1 The gravity of this contracting
phase in real estate transactions is also felt, partly in a historical way, through the
Statute of Frauds requirement on land-sale contracts, which requires evidence of
36 See ALEX M. JOHNSON, JR., UNDERSTANDING MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 57 (3d. ed.
2012) ("When most people think about the agreements or contracts that are involved in purchasing
real property, they think about the listing agreement with the broker and the dead that is executed
at closing that transfers title of the real property from seller to buys. Rarely do they give much or
anything thought to the most important agreement involved in the transaction, the standard real
estate purchase and sale of the contract."); see also GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (6th ed. 2009) (breaking down the real estate
transaction into three "Acts" and locates the contracting phrase, which includes mortgages entirely
in "Act Two").
37 See LEFCOE, supra note 36.
38 JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 57.
39 Id.
40 LEFCOE, supra note 36, at 2. Lefcoe labels the period of contracting in a real estate transaction
as the "executory period," in which "the buyer's offer is made contingent on her approval of a
throughout physical inspection of the property and a title report" and "[t]he buyer's obligation to
purchase may also be made contingent on receipt of suitable mortgage financing." Id.
41 Id.
Ed 1] 43
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writing during the enforcement phase. 42 Another feature that underscores the
importance of a purchase agreement contract is the fact that when real estate
transactions go awry, "the purchase and sale contract is perhaps the most
frequently litigated aspect of the typical residential real estate transaction." 43 All
in all, such observations illustrate the general significance of contract law in
facilitating and enforcing the purchase and sales of property between individual
parties.
When it comes to financing the transaction through lending and
mortgages-arguably "the most important and complex element of most
transactions" 4 4 -contracting is instrumental because "[r]arely is real property
purchased without the use of some type of financing." 45 Although one can
recognize the specialized category that mortgage agreements occupy and view
mortgages through property lenses, "mortgages involve contracts and are subject
to the general law of contracts, unless that law is specifically displaced, for
example, by statute." 4 6 In broad terms, the typical contracts perspective toward
mortgages assesses the transaction as an agreement by a lender to loan a specific
amount to the borrower in order to cover the price of the property. As Cohen
explains, "[o]nce a lender makes the loan, the lender generally has no further
contractual duties to the borrower; the borrower has duties of performance." 4 7
The borrower's performance involves payment for a specified length of time to
the lender of the principal at the stipulated rate of interest.48 The lender, however,
hedges some of the risk of non-payment by obtaining a security interest in the
property that was purchased by the borrower's loan amount.49 In the event that
the borrower fails to repay the loan-or in mortgage parlance, the borrower
42 Id. at 66-69 (reciting the brief history, requirements, and functions of the Statute of Frauds); see
also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 366 (3d ed. 1999). Farnsworth notes that "[t]he land
contract provision [of the Statute of Frauds] performs a significant channeling function, by
furnishing a simple test of enforceability to mark off unenforceable agreements from enforceable
ones. It is noteworthy that the most durable and well-regarded of the statute's provisions are those
that fulfill more than just the original evidentiary purpose."
43 JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 57.
4 Id. at 119.
45Id.
46 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 4 n.6.
4 Id.
48 Id. at 4-5.
49 See id. at 5 (describing that "the lender bears the default risk" and how, inter alia, one of the
ways to protect against such risk is "requiring collateral (for example, in a mortgage contract, the
house)"); see also JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 120 ("The mortgage itself creates and grants the
mortgagee a security interest in the borrower-mortgagor's real property."). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "security interest" as "a property interest created by agreement or by operation of law to
secure performance of an obligation, esp. repayment of a debt; specif., an int'rest in personal
property or fixtures securing payment or performance of an obligation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1562 (10th ed. 2014).
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"defaults"-the lender has a claim for redress. The claim for redress is typically
by a court order to foreclose on the interest in the property that the lender
received as part of the loan agreement.50 Of course, other ways in which lenders
protect themselves from the danger associated with borrower defaults include the
interest rate and the size of the down payment.
Prior to the 1980s, mortgages associated with the financing of home
purchases in the United States were traditionally long-term fixed-rate mortgages,
in which interest rates were set or "fixed" at the outset of the loan, often with the
ability by borrowers to refinance later.5 2 Todd Zywicki's quick historiography of
utilizing fixed-rate mortgages in American home-buying shows a curious account
of their rise. Zywicki calls the thirty-year fixed rate mortgage "an accident of
history, not a conscious policy choice"53 and observes that they "arose as a
desperate, government-motivated innovation during the Great Depression to
reduce foreclosures by stretching out payment terms for a longer period to reduce
monthly payments." 54 Originally, before the rise of long-term fixed-rate
mortgages, home loans were shorter, typically between five to ten years.5 5 Long-
term fixed rate mortgages were unique to the United States, as other countries did
not adopt this type of mortgage. 56 Part of the use of the long-term fixed-rate
50 LEFCOE, supra note 36, at 6 ("Defaulting mortgagors risk the mortgagee petitioning a court to
order a foreclosure of the borrower's interest in the security property by public auction conducted
by the sheriff.").
Cohen, supra note 29, at 5.
52 See JOHN W. REILLY, THE LANGUAGE OF REAL ESTATE 173 (3d. ed. 1989) (defining a fixed rate
loan as "[a] loan with the same rate of interest for the life of the loan. Until the late 1970s and early
1980s, the fixed-rate loan was the usual type of real estate loan. With the arrival of highly volatile
interest rates, lenders attempted to adjust interest rates with a variety of new and different loans. As
the quasi-governmental agencies changed their guidelines, establishing a marketplace for these
new adjustable rate loans, it became evident that the fixed-rate loan would be seen less and less in
the real estate market."); Cohen, supra note 29, at 5-6 (explaining that in a fixed-rate mortgage,
"[i]f interest rates fall, mortgage lenders bear the risk because mortgage contracts typically give
borrowers the right to make payments early (prepayment right), including the right to pay off the
entire loan. Thus borrowers have an incentive to refinance their mortgages when interest rates drop
sufficiently, which deprives lenders of the higher interest payments at the initial rate."); Todd
Zywicki, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Fixed-Rate Mortgages (and Other Just-So
Stories), 21 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 157, 168-69 (2013) (footnote omitted) (noting that the U.S. is
"almost alone in the world by including a standard provision in mortgage contracts that permits the
borrower a unilateral prepayment option, and thus the option to refinance, at almost any time.").
53 Zywicki, supra note 52, at 162.
Id. (citing Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and
International Context, 19 J. EcoN. PERSP. 93, 94 (2005)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 164 (noting that "the United States is one of only two countries in the world with long-
term fixed-rate mortgages and an unlimited right to repay without penalty").
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mortgage was to deal with issues of risk-bearing by lenders that arose in the Great
Depression.
Prior to the Great Depression, lenders had little risk with short-term
mortgages. If borrowers defaulted, lenders could sell off the property and recover
any outstanding amount on the property.5 ' However, real estate values had
crashed by 50 percent or more during the Great Depression, making refinancing
short-term mortgages difficult. 59 As a result, the U.S. government created
programs to ameliorate the crisis and its risks for lenders; for instance, the
creation of the Home Owner's Loan Corporation "raised funds to purchase
defaulted mortgages from financial institutions and reinstated them, converting
variable-rate, short-term, nonamortizing mortgages into fixed-rate, long-term
(twenty-year), fully amortizing mortgages."6 0 Also, "the FHA was introduced to
provide mortgage insurance so that investors would be willing to buy these
restructured mortgages from the government despite their now high loan-to-value
ratios." 6 1 These programs ultimately became the federally-backed loan operations
we have today. 62 In these ways, the long-term fixed-rate mortgage became the
long-standing financing choice in which traditional loan agreements were molded
for generations after the Great Depression.
B. Riskier Lending
The rise of adjustable-rate mortgages in the recent decades changed the
risk-bearing relationship in the traditional fixed-rate mortgages from lender to
borrower. 63 These devices allow for fluctuations in the interest rate during the
length of the mortgage, according to conditions agreed to by the parties. 64
However, the benefits to adjustable-rate mortgages involve not only the shifting




61 Id. One other federal program created at this time - as that Zywicki mentions - is the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA). Id.
62 See id. (noting that over time these "responses to the Great Depression evolved into the federal
government-sponsored enterprise system of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.").
63 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 5-6 ("Since the 1980s ... lenders have been able to shift the risk
of rising interest rates to borrowers by contracting for adjustable-rate mortgages for which the
interest rate varies with a particular market rate of interest."); see also Lisa Prevost, The Siren Call
of the Adjustable-Rate Loan, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/
realestate/the-siren-call-of-the-adjustable-rate-loan.html ("Adjustable loans, which are usually
amortized over a 30-year term, carry greater risk for the borrower, because the rate may rise after
an initial period of fixed interest.").
64 See JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 139 (defining the adjustable-rate mortgage as "a financing
device in which the interest rate of the mortgage may fluctuate throughout the duration of the
mortgage pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in the mortgage.").
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of the risk-bearing of higher interest rates to the borrower, but also permits the
borrower to reap the advantages if interest rates plunge.65 Compared to the fixed-
rate mortgages, there are advantages that adjustable fixed-rate mortgages can
inherently offer. One of the most apparent advantage is the possible affordability
of the loan because the borrower is not paying at a long-term interest rate that
may be higher than actual market rates during the duration of the term.66
Innovations themselves are not necessarily dangerous things; rather the
dangers exist in the way innovations are harnessed and used. And as one
commentator on the financial crisis has noted, during the housing boom,
"[i]nnovations in financial contracting also contributed to the expansion in
demand for housing assets." 6 7 Thus, contract has its place as a tool for building
the events that resulted in the Great Recession. But contractual innovations, such
as lending innovations, were only made conducive by the historical and political
context of the early 2000s. In the years leading to the rise of the housing market
and subsequent financial crisis, certain combined political and economic events
contributed to the increased dependency on innovative lending products that
deviated from practices that had become more or less conventional after the Great
Recession. First, gradual deregulation of the banking and finance industries
starting in the 1970s and 1980s stimulated innovation more readily. 68 For
example, Ronald Regan's presidency marked important deregulation changes for
the lending industry:
Under President Reagan, the Controller of Currency (OCC) in
1981 authorized national banks to offer adjustable-rate mortgages
65 Id. at 140 ("The rationale behind such apparently complicated devices is quite simple and
reasonable. The use of an [adjustable-rate mortgage] shifts the risk of the possible higher interest
rates during the term of the loan from the financial institution to the mortgagor. Similarly, it
permits the mortgagor to benefit from declining interest rates.").
66 See, e.g., Prevost, supra note 63. As Prevost notes, "[u]sing an ARM can save the borrower
thousands in interest payments during the teaser period, because the rate is lower than that of a
fixed-rate product. And for the most qualified buyers, ARM rates on jumbo loans, or loans above
$417,000, are even lower than rates on conforming loans." Id. In the article, Prevost quotes an
example by Peter Grabel, a mortgage loan originator, to externalize the possible benefit for
borrowers of the adjustable-rate mortgage: "According to Mr. Grabel's calculations, on a $417,000
loan, a seven-year ARM with an initial rate of 3.625 percent would save the borrower more than
$20,000 in the first 10 years compared with a 30-year loan at a rate of 4.375 percent." Id. The
benefits in the example rely on some assumptions: "His estimate assumes, however, that the initial
ARM rate stays the same in Years 8, 9 and 10. And given that ARM indexes, too, are at historic
lows, that may be an overly optimistic assumption going forward." Id.
67 Robert E. Kramer, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: A Five-Year Retrospective, 10
U. ST. THoMAs J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 20 (2015).
68 Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial Innovation and
"Too Big To Fail," 90 DENV. U.L. REV. 505, 516-24 (2012). Murdock gives an extensive account
of the political and economic reasons for deregulation, much of it is beyond the scope of this
Article. Id.
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(ARMs), and Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, which further enabled savings and loan
institutions to expand their lending activities into commercial
lending and even junk bonds. The Act also authorized state-
chartered banks to issue ARMs, putting them on parity with
national banks, and gave the OCC the authority to lift restrictions
on loan-to-value ratios, maturities, and amortization schedules.
The Controller exercised this authority the following year.69
Such deregulation continued well into the Clinton Administration and into the
2000s. 70 Part of the lifting of restrictions in lending practices during this time led
to trouble in the financial sector-for instance, with the disastrous savings and
loan crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s7 -but also to the popularity of
diversified lending markets that shifted away from traditional prime lending, such
as the subprime markets.72
As the foundations of the housing crisis had been installed by the early
2000s because of deregulation, the rest of the conditions and events that created
the housing boom were taking shape in the years leading up to the Great
Recession. According to Dawinder Sidhu, "[s]everal factors created the
conditions for a surge of mortgage contracts" that led eventually to the economic
crisis.73 All of these factors had underlying goals of encouraging homeownership
and investment.74 For examples, Sidhu cites that "[1]ow interest rates designed
in part to encourage economic activity in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
69 Id. at 517.
70 Id. at 519-24.
7 See id. at 541.
72 See KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV.
AND RES., SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSEs, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 9 (2002),
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf ("As prime refinance loan volumes fell
after the Federal Reserve increased interest rates in 1994, originators sought other markets to
serve-the subprime market was an obvious choice. Brokers and mortgage companies started to
originate a larger number of subprime mortgages in 1994 as a means to maintain profits and utilize
existing capacity."). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau provides that "[a] subprime
mortgage is generally a loan that is meant to be offered to prospective borrowers with impaired
credit records. The higher interest rate is intended to compensate the lender for accepting the
greater risk in lending to such borrowers. The interest rate on subprime and prime ARMs can rise
significantly over time." What Is a Subprime Mortgage, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-subprime-mortgage-en-110/ (last
updated Feb. 24, 2017).
73 Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Crisis of Confidence and Legal Theory: Why the Economic Downturn
Should Help Signal the End of the Doctrine ofEfficient Breach, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 357, 372
(2011).
Id. ("The government's interest in expanding home ownership and the people's interest in




terrorist attacks-furthered the attractiveness of desire for homeownership."7 1
During the same time, the lenders began to accommodate less traditional
borrowers, invariably reaching for those who were willing to enter into subprime
loans: "While some prospective homeowners undoubtedly qualified for and
bought mortgages at the prime rates, others seeking property but unable to obtain
such prime mortgages were offered and took subprime mortgage contracts,
generally defined as loans sold to riskier borrowers at higher interest rates." 7 6 The
implications of such expansion through the subprime markets meant that more
individuals could enter into homeownership, but the realities of this accessibility
meant more risk as well:
[M]ortgages were available to individuals who had poor credit
and were more likely to default on a loan at rates that pushed
mortgage payments at the margins of or beyond what the
individuals could realistically afford. Subprime mortgage
contracts requiring borrowers to put little or no money down were
particularly alluring, but they only exacerbated the likelihood of
default. Borrowers did not have to meet a threshold of financial
wherewithal, and the borrowers' personal investment into the
property was limited and thus minimally deterred borrowers from
walking away. Subprime activity was lacking other safeguards, as
well. For example, lenders approved subprime loans without
looking into a borrower's income or assets.77
As Charles Murdock notes, "the mortgage market of 2003-2007 bore little
relations to the pre-2000 market. The number of subprime loans jumped from
456,631 in 2000 to 2,284,420 in 2005.",' The same went for Alt-A loans-loans
that did not require customary documentation-which rose from 78,183 to
7 Id. (citing Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to Resolve the Foreclosure Crisis, 61 OKLA L. REV. 561,
567 (2008)).
76 Id. (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1016
(2009)).
Id. at 372-73 (citing Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime
Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1272 (2009); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits
of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 779 (2006); Jacob
Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323-24 (2009); Daniel J.
Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit
Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 666 (2009)) (footnotes omitted).
Murdock, supra note 68, at 525 (citing U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R,
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 24 (2009) [hereinafter
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE]).
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1,447,782 between the same five-year period.7 9 Rsky innovations in lending
abounded; for example, in addition to subprime lending and Alt-A loans, there
was the use of pick-a-pay loans-which let borrowers pick the amount to pay,
often resulting in negative amortization. 0 And it was in this period that the
adjustable-rate mortgages "supplanted the traditional thirty-year fixed-payment
mortgage."81 Beyond these new variations in mortgage contracts, "[o]ther
innovations include low down payments, various forms of back loading the
mortgage contract, and adjustable rate mortgages, such as the 2/28 mortgage. The
2/28 mortgage offered the borrower a low fixed-rate for two years and then
floated with some short-term rate . .. plus a risk premium."8 2 All of these types of
loans provided access for borrowers to homeownership: "These somewhat exotic
contract forms, along with the encouragement of government policy, enabled
many individuals who were unable to obtain a standard qualified mortgage to
obtain the financing necessary to buy a home." 83 But the externality for home-
buying accessibility was an inevitable moral hazard as the extreme rise in lending
came also with shoddy protections in the making of these loans: "Mortgage
lenders stopped verifying the borrower's financial information. "84
Various commentators have noted the opportunistic motivations behind
lenders' decisions to alter the practices of mortgage contracting to allow for such
risky behavior. In the rhetorical way that Sidhu summarizes the risks, any
justification would seem ludicrous:
Why would lenders extend mortgage contracts to individuals who
were bad credit risks, where the loan terms rendered loan
satisfaction a modest prospect, where the borrowers did not have
7 Id. (citing CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE, supra note 78, at 24).
80 Id. ("Other products, such as pick-a-pay loans, came into the market. A pick-a-pay loan
permitted a borrower to choose the amount of the mortgage payment, which could be even less
than the accruing interest, thereby creating a negative amortization situation."). Amortization is
"[t]he act or result of gradually extinguishing a debt." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 49,
at 103.
81 Murdock, supra note 68, at 525. Murdock also notes that when interest rates on such adjustable-
rate loans reset, borrowers were often unable to pay at the higher rate. Id. More specific statistics
are found in The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's 2011 report, which states
[a]n adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) gave buyers even lower initial payments
or made a larger house affordable-unless interest rates rose. In 2001, just 4%
of prime borrowers with new mortgages chose ARMs; in 2003, 10% did. In
2004, the proportion rose to 21%. Among subprime borrowers, already heavy
users of ARMs, it rose from around 60% to 76%.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 85 (2011) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (footnotes omitted).
82 Kramer, supra note 67, at 21.
83 Id.
84 Murdock, supra note 68, at 525.
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to meaningfully demonstrate their financial soundness, and where
the lenders themselves seemingly turned a blind eye to the
financial condition of the borrowers? 5
But while the housing market was expanding and the corresponding lending
market was also swelling, the gains from the volume of loans-albeit extremely
risky loans-were seemingly exorbitant; lenders profited from high fees from
borrowers in these subprime loans and from selling these loans off to be created
by financial firms as securities, thus displacing the risk from themselves to
financial investors on Wall Street: "Profits for mortgage lenders and investment
bankers increased dramatically, as did CEO compensation, sales and finder
commissions, and bonuses." 8 6 Opportunity overtook caution: "Rating agencies
sold their AAA ratings to the investment bankers, who compensated the rating
agencies handsomely for their ratings. Volume, not quality, was the touchstone.
Everybody was making money hand over fist. Financial professionals apparently
expected the joyride to go on forever.", 7 The intricacies of the investment
products that derived from mortgage contracts and their use during the Great
Recession are beyond the scope of this Article. However, their increased
popularity during that time has a background influence-perhaps ultimately
undue pressure-on the direction in which the innovations of mortgage contracts
served the American home loan market and how they contributed to the eventual
crisis.
During the housing boom, "[s]everal of these factories were originating,
packaging, securitizing and selling at the rate of $1 billion a day." As a result,
"[t]he quality control process failed at a variety of stages during the
manufacturing, distribution and on-going servicing." 89 Part of the lack of quality
control was due to the shifting of risks from the original lender to financial firms
that securitized mortgage loans and then pooled them for investment purposes.
85 See, e.g., Sidhu, supra note 73, at 373.
86 Murdock, supra note 68, at 525; see also Sidhu, supra note 73, at 373. To answer his rhetorical
question, Sidhu states:
[q]uite simply, lenders charged significant fees to borrowers for originating
subprime loans and subsequently sold the mortgages to Wall Street, which in
turn created securities backed by these loans. Lenders not only made money in
selling the loans, but did so by passing the risks associated with the subprime
mortgages to financial investors. In short, loan "[o]riginators were hardly
bothered by this lack of creditworthiness because they were able to sell the
loans they made to promoters who bundled them to back [securities] that were
sold by Wall Street firms."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
87 Murdock, supra note 68, at 525.
Id (citing Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (testimony of
Keith Johnson, Former Pres., Clayton Holdings, Inc. & Wash. Mut.'s Long Beach Mortg.).
89 Id.
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Traditionally, the credit-worthiness of borrowers was a concern for lending
institutions because faulty assessment of a borrower's condition could backfire
subsequently down the line.90 However, the transient pace of loans that were sold
quickly to become securitized-loans that had shoddy requirements to begin
with-displaced the need for traditional protections.9 1 In fact, several
commentators have noted the "arms-length" transactional nature of these
mortgage contracts and how it undermined risk-bearing during this period by
upholding the dispassionate business aspects of such transactions, rather than
instilling fiduciary relationships or some association based on confidence and
trust. 92
90 See Christopher K. Odinet, Banks, Break-in, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure, 83 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1155, 1164-65 (2015).
91 Id. at 1165
But, with the ability to sell the loan immediately after making it, this borrower
protection, originally built into the system of lending, was completely
eviscerated. A bank need not worry about the quality of the borrower since a
subsequent default would be someone else's problem. This was especially true
since in the early years of adjustable rate subprime loans the borrower was
indeed able to make the monthly payments. It would not be until about two to
three years into the loan, when the originator bank had long since sold the loan
to a third party, that the rate would adjust and become too high for the borrower
to make the debt service.
(footnotes omitted).
92 See id.
And to add yet another defective wheel to the cart, the mortgage servicer who
was charged with dealing with the borrower-including addressing any issues
that may arise if the borrower became behind on his payments- was
financially incentivized by virtue of the servicing agreement to work in favor of
neither the interest of the borrower nor the owner of the loan.
see also
A substantial factor bolstering the subprime mortgage crisis stems from the
intrinsic nature of lending. Lenders and borrowers typically engage in arms-
length business transactions where each side strives to advance its own interests
since the creditor-borrower relationship does not generally constitute a fiduciary
relationship requiring lenders to safeguard the borrowers' interests. In fact, in
the loan underwriting process, lenders generally have no duty to refrain from
making a loan if they arguably should know that the borrowers cannot repay the
loan. This is in large part because a mortgage loan is recognized as 'a business
transaction where each party seeks its own economic interest, rather than a
relationship of trust and confidence.' While a lender has 'no judicially imposed
duty to ensure a [borrower's] ability to repay the loan, most lenders, prior to the
subprime mortgage boom, refused to make a loan in which the borrower's
ability to repay was doubtful.
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 5, 15-16 (2009) (quoting Frank A. Hirsch, Jr., The Evolution of a Suitability
Standard in the Mortgage Lending Industry: The Subprime Meltdown Fuels the Fire of Change, 12
N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 22 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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Eventually, of course, the opportunistic use of mortgage contract
innovations caught up with the realities of a housing market bolstered by
unscrupulous lending practices of the financial institutions, irresponsible
purchases, and the financing of homes by borrowers who could not keep up with
the repayment terms they had bargained for.93 The artificial rise in home prices
fueled by the volume of demand and purchases overextended homebuyers when
interest rates increased and prices of homes started to fall in 2006 and 2007, and
many subprime borrowers could not refinance their loans.9 4 The result was
obviously harsh and catastrophic. The inherent weakness of innovations in
mortgage contracts become apparent when their once-attractive terms and
features-for instance, adjustable-rate mortgages-now proceeded to function
with the hike in interest rates and the depreciation of home equity in falling
housing prices. In addition, the execution of such financial innovations began to
prove harmful as well: "When housing price appreciation began to slow, the
consequences of weak underwriting, including little or no documentation and
zero or minimal required payments, became obvious. Some homeowners unable
to refinance began to default as their mortgage loans reset to high interest rates
and payments or the amount of the loan exceeded the new lower market value of
the home." 95 Just as lending had been voluminous, so was the threat of default:
"Because [subprime borrowers] could not continue to enjoy their relatively low
monthly payments, and because they could not sustain these now adjusted and
much higher debt obligations, they defaulted en masse."96 Of course, the recourse
by those who had standing to enforce these loans was to foreclose on the
unrecoverable debts: "In turn, banks-or, rather, their mortgage servicers-began
to foreclose on these defaulted properties across the United States." 9 7 From here,
what was sustained was not the innovative nature of contract drafting but the
93 Id. at 16 ("The events leading us to this point began many years ago, starting with lax and
imprudent lending practices by banks and financial institutions, and furthered by borrowers buying
houses they could not afford and taking out mortgages they could not pay.") (footnotes omitted).
94 See id. at 17-18 ("One unfortunate consequence of the inflation of the housing market was that
mortgage brokers came to view their loans as well-secured by the rising values of their real estate
collateral and, therefore, failed to focus sufficiently on borrowers' ability to repay. Millions of
homeowners took advantage of the interest rate drops to refinance their existing mortgages, but
once interest rates began to rise and housing prices started to drop moderately in many parts of the
United States in late 2006 and early 2007, refinancing became more difficult.") (footnotes
omitted); see also Odinet, supra note 90, at 1165 ("This defective system, underpinned by greed
and buttressed by artificial home prices, finally came crashing down beginning in 2006. As
property values decreased, subprime borrowers, who up until now believed they could refinance
their debt before the adjustable interest rates spiked, found themselves unable to do so.") (footnote
omitted).
95 Moran, supra note 7, at 18.
96 Odinet, supra note 90, at 1165-66.
97 Id.
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harsh bite of the contract enforcement as financial institutions dealt with massive
incidences of borrower breach.
C. Defaults and Foreclosures
Several possibilities generally exist that cause borrowers to default on
their mortgage contracts. As Gerald Komgold has summarized, the specific
reasons common among defaults during the financial crisis were the risk-heavy
uses of the innovative lending contracts and practices that contributed to the rise
of the housing market in the first place:
Then came the mid-2000s when borrowers began defaulting on
mortgage loans. This occurred for a variety of reasons: many of
the latest borrowers were financially unsound and were soon
unable to make the payments; low initial teaser rates of interest
(offered by the banks on variable rate mortgages to attract
borrowers) expired and were reset at higher rates; and the real
estate market plateaued or even declined, so borrowers could not
refinance their way out of trouble. Lenders began foreclosing, and
properties did not sell well-or eventually at all-in the depressed
and saturated market.98
Falling home prices contributed to situations in which many mortgages in the
U.S. became "underwater," meaning the amount homeowners owed on their loans
exceeded the value of their homes. 99 As cited by Brent White, toward the end of
the Great Recession in 2009, "more than 34% of all mortgaged properties in the
United States were 'underwater.' "1oo White's 2010 research lists stunning
statistics of substantial and widespread percentages of mortgages in different
regions around the country that exhibited negative equity.101 These underwater
98 Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage
Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REv. 727, 730-31 (2009) (citing Gretchen Morgenson, Can These
Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TwIEs (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/
business/30country.html; Issue Brief, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, CRA Is Not to Blame for the
Mortgage Meltdown, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.responsible
lending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/cra-not-to-blame-for-crisis.pdf,
Anthony Lendez & David Hille, Is There a Legal Defense to the Mortgage Mess?: Litigation
Arising from the Subprime Market Collapse Will Hinge on Lenders' Good Faith, NAT'L L.J. (Apr.
21, 2008), at S1, S7).
99 See, e.g., Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 971 (2010) (defining "underwater"
as "meaning that [borrowers] owe more than their homes are worth") (footnote omitted).
100 Id. at 973 (citing Media Alert, First Am. CoreLogic, First American CoreLogic Releases Q3
Negative Equity Data (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.loanperformance.com/infocenter/library/FACL
Negative Equity Media AlertQ3_ 112409 Final.pdf.)
101 See id. at 973-79.
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statistics-though at the tail-end of the Great Recession-seem to corroborate
that the conditions for defaulting subprime borrowers, when refinancing was not
available and continuing payment was improbable, were evident and ongoing. In
March 2008, just a year prior to White's research, during the midst of the Great
Recession, defaults on home mortgage contracts reached an apex-to a
percentage that surpassed the percentages in 1979-because of the difficulties
associated with adjustable-rate mortgages and partly with the subprime lending
market. 102 In fact, of the defaults reported in this apex, the highest percentages of
defaults were with adjustable-rate mortgages. 103 Even defaults in prime
adjustable-rate mortgages increased dramatically-nearly doubling from 4.3
percent in 2006 to 8.1 percent. 10 4
Contractually, the event of a mortgage default (i.e., breach) by a borrower
triggers the enforcement rights by the lender.o10 In the typical default situation,
several legal events may occur prior to foreclosure. A borrower may have the
ability to cure the default and reinstate the mortgage within a short period of
time; 106 the borrower's rights may be accelerated by the lender/mortgagee if
default is not cured in the stipulated time frame;107 additional opportunity may be
given to cure default after acceleration; 10s and the prepayment clauses in the
mortgage contract may be enforced.109 If the borrower is unable to comply with
the terms of the acceleration, her property interest is foreclosed. 110 Historically,
there was one more resolution available to the defaulting borrower after
foreclosure proceedings had begun: equity of redemption. Equity of redemption
allowed equity courts to permit a defaulting borrower another opportunity to cure
and redeem property interest from foreclosure within a period after the stipulated
time so long as the borrower made the mortgagee whole, which allowed many
foreclosure transactions to be set aside.1 Modem foreclosure procedures,
however, try to extinguish the borrower's equity of redemption after default and
acceleration. 1 12 Partly because equity of redemption reflected the traditional
102 Vikas Bajaj, Mortgage Defaults Reach a New High, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/business/06cnd-mortgage.html (citing report from the Mortgage
Bankers Association during that time).
103 id.
104 Id.
1os JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 219-20.




110 Id. at 221.
I Id. at 222.
112 Id. at 223; see also Jesse G. Reyes, The Swinging Pendulum of Equity: How History and
Custom Shaped the Development of the Receivership Statute in Illinois, 44 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1019,
1040 (2013) ("When a mortgagor becomes delinquent on the mortgage, one factor that affects the
timeframe during which the mortgagee can foreclose is the redemption right.") (footnote omitted).
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significance of equity within the realm of mortgages"1 and afforded borrowers "a
measure of substantive fairness" when the mortgage contracts were enforced. 11 4
We can surmise this from historical reference because, absent the force of equity,
mortgages had been historically-at least in England-enforced more strictly:
Prior to the advent of Chancery, the courts of law stringently
enforced the mortgage as it was written. In the event the
mortgagor failed to satisfy the debt on the precise date and for the
exact amount as set forth in the mortgage agreement, the
mortgagee became the unconditional owner of the land.115
Accordingly, before the availability of foreclosure, "[i]n the event of a default,
the mortgagor would irrevocably forfeit the land to the mortgagee. This rule was
absolute; Thus, time was of the essence. "116
In mortgage contracts, the specter of American contract law and its
underscoring of freedom of contracting principles have resulted in strict
enforcement of defaults.117 As described by Nestor Davidson, "[f]rom the earliest
history of mortgage law, lenders have had a tendency to invoke the hard edges of
law's formal clarity[.]""' But defaulting borrowers would seek out tractability by
"invok[ing] equity's flexibility to respond to the resulting unfairness."119 Modem
evolutions of American mortgage law limited some of equity's reach in
foreclosure proceedings. 120 While financial and contractual innovations facilitated
the housing boom of the 2000s and imparted flexibility on the market for both
lenders and borrowers at the formation stage of mortgage contracts, that spirit of
flexibility was absent when it came time to enforce delinquent mortgages during
the financial crisis: "Today, lenders continue to have the arsenal of formalism at
their grasp-setting and enforcing the terms of payment deadlines, filing
requirements, servicing-related obligations (such as insurance), and other
113 See Reyes, supra note 112, at 1035-40. (providing a historical account of the equity of
redemption from its origins in England to the United States.)
114 Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U.L. REV.
389, 392 (2013).
us Reyes, supra note 112, at 1036.
116 id.
n7 Michael Giusto, Mortgage Foreclosure for Secondary Breaches: A Practitioner 's Guide to
Defining "Security Impairment," 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 2563, 2572-74 (2005) ("The traditional
power of the freedom of contract concept has been invoked in the context of mortgage
foreclosures.") (discussing Graf v. Hope Building Corp., 171 N.E. 884 (N.Y. 1930), where "the
New York Court of Appeals its support of freedom of contract in mortgage agreements, ordering
strict enforcement of a debt acceleration provision for a failure to make a timely interest
payment").
us Davidson, supra note 114, at 392.
119 Id.
120 JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 223.
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requirements that reflect the approach of early lenders to law day."121 Conversely,
"[b]orrowers, prior to the housing crisis and since, continue to counter by
invoking questions of fraud, usury, and similar substantive claims about the terms
or conditions of lending, despite the rarity of decisions that validate these
claims." 12 2 In the context of possible evolving property jurisprudence after the
Great Recession, Davidson suggests that such strict adherence to mortgage
agreements stemming from the Great Recession signals a new formalism in
property law-specifically a formalism that "may leave a mortgage-distress
system that is more attuned to procedural regularity than to substantive norms."123
Of course, scholarly views about the interactions between procedural and
substantive functions also have been made about contract law, with procedure
often having a heavier emphasis. 124 Such observations also bring to mind H.L.A
Hart's classification of contract law as occupying his category of secondary rules,
rather than primary rules within his conception of law. 12 5 On the whole,
procedural regularity is part of the classical theoretical interpretation of contracts:
"Under the classical revival, formality reigns at two levels. First, the contract
doctrine itself becomes more formal; ostensibly clear, rigid rules are favored over
flexible standards. Second, the substance of the rules favors formality in
contracting practices."126 Translating that theoretical consideration to practice,
some have noted that the job that courts frequently perform while enforcing
contractual bargains is merely to "ensure procedural fair play, but nothing
more." 127 Again, this position by courts reflects contract as a system or body of
121 Davidson, supra note 114, at 418.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 430.
124 See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 599 (2005) ("A good
deal of the contemporary doctrine on Contract Procedure assumes the wholesale application of
extant principles of contract law.").
125 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (1st ed. 1961); see also Mark Edwin
Burge, Too Clever by Half Reflections on Perception, Legitimacy, and Choice of Law Under
RevisedArticle ] of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 357, 393 (2015)
("Hart raised a dichotomy that is useful for present purposes: the separation of law into categories
of primary rules and secondary rules. Primary rules are those that govern conduct by creating
obligation to engage in or refrain from particular acts, such as the rules of criminal law and tort
law. All other legal rules, in Hart's conception, are secondary rules. While secondary rules include
matters of legal procedure-such as the process by which a legal rule comes to be recognized as
valid law-secondary rules also include matters of private ordering and obligation, a category that
includes the law of contracts.") (footnotes omitted) (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
79-99 (1st ed. 1961)).
126 Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U.
L. REv. 1, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Un-Making Law].
127 Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Law, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1041
(1985)); Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 175, 186 (2009) (citing American Legal Realism 99 (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz
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law that predominantly serves to order the obligations and promises of
contracting parties into their own privately created and enforceable laws. 128
Davidson's idea of a kind of formalism being enforced during the 2008
housing crisis is shared by other scholars-not in property law particularly, but
rather in the practical operations of contract doctrines during the crisis. 1 29 Such
inclinations toward formalism during this time might have been, in part, due to
the ongoing "revival" of formalism in contract law that had already been
underway in scholarship and practice.130 For instance, to underscore the same
inflexibility during the enforcement of mortgage defaults in the Great Recession,
Cohen specifically notes that "[d]iscussions on the crisis tend to say little about
contract law, because they simply assume that the contracts at issue should and
will be strictly enforced; given that assumption, there is not much more to say."131
The underlying assumption in his observations is that "[t]he new formalism,
apparently ascendant in the academy, already seems to have prevailed in the
public realm despite the greatest economic catastrophe we have seen since the
Great Depression." 13 2
However, Cohen also posits that within the reality of defaults and
foreclosures in the Great Recession, inflexibility and rigidity did not necessarily
have to ascend to prominence-at least in the ultimate resort to contract law and
doctrine. In his view, certain potentials of contract law have been ignored or
"ha[d] just been forgotten." 13 3 To elaborate, he explains that "more precisely,
contract law includes a number of flexible doctrines that lawyers and courts with
sufficient imagination and boldness could use to address what is perhaps the
biggest current problem resulting from the financial crisis: the huge number of
past, existing, and potential foreclosures of underwater residential mortgages. "134
Cohen believes that "[a] cramped view of the contract doctrine" led to some
& Thomas A. Reed eds. 1993); P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 404 (1979);
Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 126, at 111.
128 Hart, supra note 127, at 185-86 (quoting Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract
Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 831 (1983) (summarizing the way classicists approached contract law
as empowering private parties to freely enter into agreements and contractual relations with little
state regulations on substantive matters of those relations, to construct a set of private laws through
such agreements as a result, which regulates contract law as a " 'field of private ordering' ").
129 See, e.g., Priya S. Gupta, The American Dream, Deferred: Contextualizing Property after the
Foreclosure Crisis, 73 MD. L. REV. 523, 548 (2014) (discussing how the formalism of contract law
limited rights of certain borrowers facing foreclosure) ("[N]ow that homeowners could be thought
of as irresponsible investors and poor contract negotiators, their rights to their homes (investments)
could be limited by the sanctity of contract with their banks ....
130 See generally Feinman, Un-Making Law, supra note 126.
131 Cohen, supra note 29, at 3.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. (emphasis added).
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unpromising legislation solutions during the crisis, 13 5 and his assertion of possible
flexibility sounds very much like Cohen is resorting to innovation on the back-
end of contracts, when contractual relations go awry. Although Cohen cautions
that "[c]ontract law is no panacea," 13 6 he also proposes that "[c]ourt application
and enforcement of contract law in individual mortgage cases, or perhaps even
class actions, is probably not the best solution to the problem of mass
foreclosures, though it may well be better than what we have tried so far."137
Indeed, in his prediction, "cases arising out of the crisis and making their way
through the court system are likely to test the assumption of strict contractual
enforcement" and, on the whole, these cases might acknowledge that "the
flexibility of contract law may foster a greater willingness to consider creative
legislative solutions" as well. 138
Of the flexibilities of contract law that Cohen sees as potentially helpful
to defaulting borrowers, he specifically offers two categories: contract
modification and doctrines that encompass excuse through changed
circumstances, both of which could have been available absent a narrower
approach to contract law. 1 39 The doctrines themselves are not necessarily new
innovations to American contract law, and that is not Cohen's claim for
innovation. 14 0 Rather, the innovation under Cohen's proposal is a broader
approach to contract law that permits the use of such doctrines that otherwise
would have been precluded under a stricter application of contract law.14 1
Interestingly, Cohen does not expressly tether his argument for recalibrating the
approach to contract law to some equitable principle or doctrine that would allow
for the access to such flexibility-such as excuse or other contract doctrines that
historically have roots in equity.142 Instead, he justifies a broader application of
contracts through the changes in risk-bearing that were made available because of
the financial innovations at the outset of home purchases that eventually resulted
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 4.
139 See id. (noting two themes: "interference with efficient contractual modification," as the first,
and "exacerbation of and failure to protect contractual risk, implicat[ing] the excuse doctrines," as
the second that would be helpful in addressing solutions).
140 Id. at 3 (noting that contract law has existing "flexible doctrines" that are of use to practitioners
and judges "with sufficient imagination and boldness" for solving the vast number of underwater
foreclosures).
141 See id. at 4 (noting that " [a] cramped view of contract doctrine" may have affected some of the
problem-solving regarding foreclosures during the financial crisis and that "recognizing the
flexibility of contract law" may lead to helpful solutions); see also id. (noting that "the financial
crisis raises novel, important, and interesting questions for contract law that scholars ought to be
thinking about and debating" and introducing contract modifications and excuse doctrines as
subject matters within contracts for such discussion).
142 id.
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in the housing crisis. 143 Essentially, the changes in risks demand an application of
contracts that expand traditional, stricter notions of contract doctrines. 14 4 For
instance, when he explains how excuse doctrines could be available, he observes
that the conventional regard for contract law as "a strict liability system" has
sustained a restraint on the use of excuse doctrines particularly in loan
agreements, which is why arguments for excuse doctrines were not prevalent
during the Great Recession. 145 Nevertheless, Cohen proposes, "if the purpose of
excuse doctrines is to allocate unforeseen risks efficiently when courts have good
reason to doubt that the parties have done so themselves, allowing excuse for
underwater homeowners seems to fit this purpose quite well." 146 Changes in risk-
bearing as a justification for permitting the use of contractual excuse seems to
suggest that Cohen is advocating his flexible approach to contracts through
efficiency and correcting the misallocation of risks. However, it seems as if
equitable principles of fairness are lurking not far beneath the foundations of his
argument when he further explains the root causes of misallocation of risks:
Lenders engaged in conduct that they erroneously thought was
reducing risk, when in fact it was exacerbating risk to themselves,
to investors, and to homeowners. In effect, lenders succumbed to
a classic moral hazard problem, similar to drivers who respond to
mandatory seat belt laws, designed to reduce accident risk, by
driving faster, thereby increasing accident risk. Thus lenders are
most likely the superior risk bearers. If contract law is truly at
odds with that conclusion, it would be surprising, or at least raise
an interesting problem. But is it?147
143 See id. at 10-19 (explaining his method of reaching his solutions, first beginning with "an
examination of how financial wizardry changed the relevant risks").
144 See id. at 4 (noting in his thesis that the "broad and interrelated themes" of modification and
excuse doctrines "aris[e] out of these changes" and that his research will later show "how these
themes might play out under a variety of contract doctrines").
145 See id. at 46 ("It is easy to see why no one has tried to make this argument. Contract law has
traditionally been understood as a strict liability system, with the availability of excuse severely
restricted. Perhaps in no area are these principles more strictly followed than in debt (loan) and
other financial contracts. Even the Great Depression did not lead courts to apply excuse doctrines
to relieve contracting parties, including mortgage borrowers.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note.; George M. Cohen, The Fault That Lies Within Our Contract Law,
107 MICH. L. REv. 1445 (2009); RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CONTRACTS IN CRISES: EXCUSE DOCTRINE
AND RETROSPECTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTS 102-03 (2007)).
146 Cohen, supra note 29, at 46.
Id. at 46-47 (citing Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL.
EcoN. 677 (1975); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977); Miller, supra
note 35, at 39 n.61, 42).
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Although, for the most part, Cohen sustains his arguments based on efficient risk
allocation-and thereby, situating his renovation for contracts on a law and
economics sentiment-he does introduce a twinge of culpability, not always to
the level of moral blameworthiness, but enough to take his reasoning beyond a
pure mathematical, efficiency-based sense of justice:
There is no question that subprime lenders could have taken a
number of steps to reduce the risk that a large number of
homeowners would find themselves underwater in their
mortgages and unable to obtain a modification of those mortgages
even if the benefits of those modifications exceeded their costs.
They could have maintained, rather than lowered, credit
standards. They could have required larger down payments,
rather than allowed smaller down payments. They could have
been more skeptical in questioning the assumptions underlying
their pricing models or in relying on the ratings of agencies. They
could have structured securitizations to facilitate efficient
modifications.14 8
In his risk-allocation assessment, Cohen's comparison between the actual conduct
of lenders to what they "could have" done seems to draw in a small hint of moral
culpability or at least fairness, which partly aligns with how equitable principles
are conventionally invoked. In the commentary about the Great Recession, Cohen
does not appear as the lone voice in contracts scholarship suggesting doctrinal
flexibility to help address the massive crumbling of home loans because of
defaults. Some, like Cohen, urge the application of excuse doctrines, such as
mistake, frustration of purpose, and impracticability. An increasing number of
scholarly claims and recommendations like Cohen's have formed a small
consensus that favors broadening the formalistic approach to contracts. Also,
often in these concurring accounts, equity in mortgage contracts makes a
comeback-not by revisiting doctrines of redemption-but specifically through
contract law itself via excuse doctrines that had originated with the encroachment
of equity in common law contract liability. Perhaps underlying these scholarly
observations promoting flexibility and innovation, a bigger commentary exists
over the force of contract law under a wholesale adherence to formalism.
According to Miller, the inflexibility of contract law during the enforcement
phase of mortgage defaults, in part, creates a "double standard" regarding the
contract law's treatment of lenders and individual homeowners, and also "points
to how the futility of a unifying theory of contract doctrine leads to law's
pragmatism." 14 9 In her observations about formalism, in the context of strategic
Cohen, supra note 29, at 61-62 (emphasis added).
149 Miller, supra note 35, at 41-42.
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defaults during the Great Recession, Miller notes how such pragmatic renovations
to approaching contract law would "potentially lead to [contract law's] very
incoherence" as far as a theoretical reading of contract law within formalism. 10
After all, contract law has been historically recapitulated by the Latin phrase
"pacta sunda servanda," and that strict adherence has, in part, permitted the
flourishing of law and economics, morality, and freedom of contract readings of
contract law and doctrines. But perhaps redemption's erosion under a modem
contracts regime is just the re-emergence of an apparent imbalance in default
situations that requires mortgage contracts-ancient and modem-to embrace
equity and flexibility to some degree. And pragmatism in contracts potentially
leads us back to that equilibrium. Otherwise, a "double standard" will continue to
perpetuate. However, such pragmatism must be specified and must avoid the
usual distinctions of status-based differences of parties in ways that permit
flexibility for some and not others.
Part III will examine specifically how this situation was made possible
within a failed pragmatic approach through the use of changed circumstances and
impracticability during the Great Recession. Although flexibility was possible in
contract enforcement, it was denied to defaulting homeowners. Such a denial not
only demonstrates the theoretical potential of contract law to be less formalistic
and more forgiving, but also demonstrates how allowing some parties access to
flexibility and not others easily engenders inequality on a cumulative scale. As
the next part will show, even pragmatic considerations that allow flexibility in
contracts can be abused. Flexibility is possible, but in the present application it is
limited in a way that allows contracts to replicate inequality.
III. IMPRACTICABLITY AS FLEXIBLITY
A. History of the Impracticability Doctrine
Impracticability has its origins in building flexibility into contracts
enforcement. At common law, the canonical cases in the development of the
impossibility doctrine, and later, impracticability, did not emerge to excuse
parties from liability until the mid-nineteenth century."' So, impracticability, like
its sibling doctrines rooted in changed circumstances, is a relatively recent
150 Id. at 42.
151 See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 312 (Q.B.) 312 (excusing lessor's
duty to lease his theater to tenants for concert performances after the theater burned down because
"from the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties must from the beginning have known
that [the contract] could not be fulfilled unless when the time for the fulfillment of the contract
arrived some particular specified thing continued to exist, so that, when entering into the contract,




addition to the longstanding rules of common law contract enforcement-rules
that were, more or less, rigid in adherence toward liability for breach. 152
Prior to the first reported impossibility case, Taylor v. Caldwell,15 3 the
doctrinal conceit in common law contracts was that, generally, few escape
provisions existed for the unforeseen rise of an event that would affect the
agreement in some way.154 Recapitulated in the maxim "pacta sunt servanda"
(that virtually, "agreements must be kept" 1 55 ), the idea of absolute liability
trumped any notion of how changes in circumstances could affect agreements. 15 6
The concept of absolute liability stood regardless of whether it made one party's
performance untenable or disturbed the purpose of the agreement on the whole. 157
The unfairness of that situation in practice seemed to have been subordinated for
the benefit of inj ecting predictability into agreed-upon contractual duties. 158
But despite that stringent nature of absolute liability in contract
enforcement, earlier common law courts did recognize certain situations where
excuse was warranted. For instance, courts recognized situations where the
promisor of a personal services contract subsequently died after the agreement
was made, the operation of law interfered with performance, or the goods or the
152 See, e.g., Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 898 (K.B.) 898 (observing that even where
duties under a lease were breached by tenant because a war displaced the tenant off the premises,
the tenant was liable because "when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon
himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract").
153 Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 309. Amongst scholars, Taylor v. Caldwell is known as the first case
involving the impossibility defense. See, e.g., Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and
Intent, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 504 (2008) ("Taylor v. Caldwell []which has been recognized as
the first case involving impossibility as a defense . . . .").
154 See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 113 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS] ("It is generally said that the early law of England, which was inclined
to enforce a contract in accordance with its literal terms in all cases, took the uncompromising
stand that neither impossibility, nor any change in circumstances, however extreme, would excuse
performance of a promise.").
155 Pacta sunt servanda, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (10th ed. 2014).
156 See MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 113 ("To hold a promisor to the literal terms
of his bargain is frequently to impose a burden upon him which neither he nor the promise had
considered as a possibility.").
157 Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics and the
Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 2183, 2187 (2005) ("Embedded in early English
common law was the rigid principle of pacta sunt servanda, which absolutely bound parties to
contractual obligations. English courts generally refused to allow for excuse even when
performance became impossible or frustrated by an unanticipated supervening event.") (footnotes
omitted).
158 See MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 113 ("While such a view promotes certainty
and ease of application, it ignores the fact that human beings are of limited foresight."); see also
JEFF FERRIELL, 13 UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS § 13.03 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that cases that
upheld absolute liability, such as Paradine, 82 Eng. Rep. at 897, "had the advantage of making the
obligations of contracts reliable").
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subject matter were destroyed and such destruction was not the promisor's
fault.159 Most of these exceptions to the general rule of absolute liability could be
read as "supervening" events that permit a breaching party to be free from
customary contractual liability.160 Correspondingly, the use of supervening events
suggests that courts allowed value judgments based on perceptions of fairness in
adjudicating performance and breach disputes. Indeed, John Murray notes that
when determining whether any of the three supervening exceptions applied to a
case, "the tendency was to view the door closed, regardless of the hardship
resulting to the promisor, with only the most compelling, isolated exceptions." 16 1
"[C]ompelling, isolated exceptions" implies that courts had discretion in contracts
cases-a modicum of discretion that existed even if "[t]he challenge was to
determine the limited exceptions to the otherwise firm general rule that
performance is not excused, and the scope of these exceptions." 16 2 Likewise,
there is almost a twinge of equity that informs the flexibility of courts
determining supervening events in each of these exceptions. We can see a parallel
of this implication later in the impracticability doctrine itself, "[w]here
supervening events made performance excessively costly, the abhorrence of
forfeiture induced courts to consider whether performance should be excused
even though it was literally possible to perform." 163 Equity, incidentally, also
abhors forfeiture1 6 4 Therefore, it is likely that the three exceptions to absolute
liability for contract breach was already destabilizing the harsh rule of pacta sunt
servanda, long before the era where they influenced larger doctrinal changes.
Ultimately, these exceptions based on supervening events were fissures in the
wall of absolute contract liability that would gradually widen the scope of those
exceptions into the modern concept of excuse.
The broadening of that scope occurred within situations involving
supervening destruction of the contracts' subject matters. In 1863, Taylor v.
Caldwell provided an exception that was doctrinally expanded to establish
159 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 113. Some scholarly resources report that courts
saw a broader exception for destruction, not just limiting it to goods, but also to the subject matter
of the deal. See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS].
160 See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 159, at § 9.5 (listing the three exceptions as
"supervening illegality," "supervening death or disability," or "supervening destruction").
161 Accord MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 113[A] (emphasis added).
162 Id.
163 Id. at § 113[2].
164 See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 69 ("Equity abhors forfeitures and will relieve against their
enforcement where it is equitable to do so and there is no complete and adequate remedy at law.")
(footnotes omitted) (citing cases).
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impossibility as an excuse.165 The case involved a four day lease of a music hall
to exhibit a performance in exchange for payment of 1100 at the end of each
day. 166 But shortly before the first performance day, the music hall accidentally
burned down. 16 7 The plaintiff, Taylor, then sued the owner of the music hall,
Caldwell, for breach of contract, and sought damages for the expenses he put
forth in preparation for the performances. 168 The court decided that Caldwell's
duty to provide the music hall to Taylor was excused because "the parties
contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the Music Hall at the time
when the concerts were to be given; that being essential to their performance." 169
What was once a small exceptional crack to the otherwise fortressed wall of
absolute liability became a larger fissure for those seeking excuse from contract
breach. Specifically, the court's consideration here that the parties "must have
contemplated"-or taken for granted-the ensuing existence of the music hall as
a basic part of their contract seemed to be a paternalistic belief or discretion that
the court had to exhibit in order to reach their decision. 170 It is this unusual level
of speculation that prompts scholarly criticism of Taylor to call what the Court of
Queen's Bench did here a "legal fiction. "171 But in terms of fairness, it likely
would not have been fair and just to keep Caldwell on the hook for the contract
when, through no fault of his own, he could no longer have physically performed
his part of the deal. Perhaps the court was innovating flexibility in contracts based
on practical realities of these parties' agreement with each other from some quasi-
equitable perspective. 17 2
The rationale in Taylor depended on the court's reading of an implied
condition into the agreement; that the performance was contingent on the
165 FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 159, at § 113; see also MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra
note 154, at § 113 [A] [1] ("The modem doctrine of impossibility of performance emerged from the
case of Taylor v. Caldwell in 1863.") (footnote omitted).
166 Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 310.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 314.
170 Id. at 312.
171 See, e.g., Kevin M. Teeven, Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the
Modern Business Corporation, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 161 (1992) (noting that the Queen's
bench "brought the civilian contemplation of the parties into Taylor v. Caldwell through the
invention of the fiction of an implied condition").
172 Accord Saul Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie De L'imprevision:
Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1985) (noting that over the course of common
law traditions in contract law, "pacta sunt servanda became such a strong principle that, at least in
the common law legal world, courts were prepared to consider the obligations created by a contract
as still standing despite the fact that their performance was physically impossible. It is clear that
such a perception of a contract is too narrow and, since the decision in Taylor v. Caldwell, with
varying results, English courts began recognizing the need to broaden that perception for the sake
of fairness.") (footnote omitted).
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continued existence of the venue. 1713 Once the music hall burned down, the
implied condition no longer existed and duties to perform were extinguished. 17 4
Although the court here observed that the parties made the deal based on some
belief that the premises would continue to exist in order for performance to be
fulfilled, the court was not deeming such contemplation to be an express part of
their mutual assent. Instead, the court resorted to a general assumption that the
parties would have made continued existence of the music hall an explicit
condition had they "brought it to their minds." 17 Thus, they must have implied
this condition when they executed their agreement. This reading of the
circumstance was the beginning of a new principle. As Murray observes:
[t]he court's analysis augured the modern formulation for the
impossibility doctrine. Such a concept appeared radical in 1863. It
is not remarkable that the court resorted to the fiction of an
implied condition. A so-called implied-in-fact condition would
suggest that the contract contains an unstated condition intended
by the parties. . . . [H]owever, the court constructed a condition
173 See Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 312 (discussing that "where, from the nature of the contract, it
appears that the parties must from the beginning have known that it could not be fulfilled unless
when the time for the fulfilment of the contract arrived some particular specified thing continued to
exist, so that, when entering into the contract, they must have contemplated such continuing
existence as the foundation of what was to be done; there, in the absence of any express or implied
warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be construed as a positive contract, but as
subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach,
performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without default of the
contractor").
171 See id. at 314 ("The principle seems to us to be that, in contracts in which the performance
depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the
performance.").
175 See id. The Queen's Bench articulated the rule below:
In none of these cases is the promise in words other than positive, nor is there
any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing shall excuse
the performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because from the nature of
the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the
continued existence of the particular person or chattel. In the present case,
looking at the whole contract, we find that the parties contracted on the basis of
the continued existence of the Music Hall at the time when the contracts were to
be given; that being essential to their performance.
We think, therefore, that the Music Hall having ceased to exist, without fault of




"implied-in-law" condition, to arrive at a result it deemed
desirable on policy grounds. 17 6
Apparently, this rationale by the Queen's Bench further cemented the doctrinal
gaps between absolute liability in contract and the use of the three existing
exceptions-supervening death, destruction of subject matter, and operation of
law-by bolstering the reasoning using a heavy-handed reading of implied
conditions that Taylor and Caldwell made in their contemplations regarding their
lease of the music hall. Thus, in the context of the earlier exceptions to absolute
liability for contract breach, Taylor strengthened these exceptions by inserting a
rationale of implied-in-law conditions. 177
Another approach to Taylor would de-emphasize implied conditions and
instead focus more heavily on the continued existence of the music hall as a basic
assumption of the parties at the time of formation. 178 In this way, the accidental
fire was a supervening event, in which its non-occurrence was part of that basic
assumption of continued existence. Thus, its occurrence, which rendered
Caldwell's performance impossible, justifiably excused Caldwell from liability.
This alternative approach emerged in later impossibility cases following Taylor,
and was part of the development of the impossibility doctrine to render non-
performance excusable. 179
Other transformations occurred to bring about more flexibility in the
doctrine of contracts. At some point, courts started to further widen the gap
created by impossibility in the conventional stronghold of absolute liability by
loosening the strict impossibility requirement to impracticability of performance
as also a reason to excuse parties from liability. 8 o Commentators have often
attributed this shift to one 1916 California Supreme Court case, Mineral Park
Land Co. v. Howard.18 1 In that case, the defendant-contractor was excused from
breach of a contract for extracting and transporting gravel from plaintiffs land
176 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 113[A][1] (referencing Oliver Wendel Holmes,
Jr., The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897)).
177 Id. at § 113 ("The early common law exceptions of death in personal contracts, destruction of
the subject matter without the fault of the promisor and discharge of a duty by operation of law
continued after 1863, but they were now supported by the implied condition analysis.").
17 See FERRIELL, supra note 158, at § 13.03[a] ("A court considering the facts of Taylor v.
Caldwell today would probably conclude that the continued existence of the theater had been a
basic assumption of the parties to the contract.").
179 See id. ("Modem decisions avoid using the [implied conditions] rationale, and ... excuse due
to changed circumstances depends on whether the nonoccurrence of the event with disrupted
performance was a 'basic assumption' on which the contract was made.") (footnotes omitted).
180 See Joseph M. Perillo, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 13.1 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Perillo].
181 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916); see also MURRAY ON CONTRACTS,
supra note 154 at § 113 [A] [2] (noting that Mineral Park Land Co. "is often viewed as the modern
foundation of the doctrine of impossibility").
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for the building of a bridge when it was found that a substantial portion of the
gravel was underwater and could not be extracted without significant expense. 18 2
The transformative phrase from Mineral Park Land Co. occurred when the court
conflated impossibility with impracticability in this case, opining that "a thing is
impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is
impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost."183
Another expansion of the doctrine, away from its original form in Taylor, was the
acknowledgment of risk bearing and the view that changed circumstances
impeding performance can also severely change the type of risks borne by parties
in their basic assumptions underlying their agreement in ways that justify excuse.
According to one court, "[i]t is implicit in the doctrine of impossibility ... that
certain risks are so unusual and have such severe consequences that they must
have been beyond the scope of the assignment of risks inherent in the contract,
that is, beyond the agreement made by the parties." 184 As a result, "[t]o require
performance in that case would be to grant the promisee an advantage for which
he could not be said to have bargained in making the contract."" In this way, the
doctrine of impossibility evolved from implied-in-law conditions to risk bearing
and eventually morphed into the doctrine of impracticability.
Today, impracticability excuses a breaching party from contract liability
based on the failure of a basic assumption formed at the time of contracting-
usually the non-occurrence of a supervening event-that subsequently renders
performance by a faultless party too burdensome to continue. Compared to earlier
incarnations and use of the impossibility doctrine, the impracticability doctrine
furthers the development of flexibility in contract law by chipping away at some
of the earlier boundaries of the contracts doctrine in pursuing a less
constraining-and perhaps, more pragmatic-version of contract law: "The
doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully
responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the community's interest
in having contracts enforced according to their terms is outweighed by the
commercial senselessness of requiring performance." 18 6 In their respective
realms, both the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts [hereinafter Restatement] recognize the
impracticability doctrine for excusing parties' breach-with both versions
possessing close similarities. 1 7 Nonetheless, along with their recognition of
182 Id. at 458-60.
183 Id. at 460.
184 Mishara Const. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Mass. 1974).
185 Id.
186 See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing the
evolution of impracticability).
187 See Perillo, supra note 180, at § 13.2 (discussing the similarities between U.C.C. § 2-615 and
Restatement (SECOND) § 261).
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frustration of purpose, both authorities illustrate how modem contract law needed
to broaden concepts of breach and liability and, as a result, relied on doctrinal
innovations to create a sense of flexibility and progression from traditional rules.
Indeed, in the modem practice of commerce, the impracticability doctrine allows
parties to access a less stringent contracts world because of such recognition for
flexibility. Underlying such flexibility is a constant element of fairness involved
in its application-perhaps continuing the fairness in which earlier impossibility
cases, such as Taylor, used to render their decisions."' As E. Allan Farnsworth
notes, impracticability "candidly recognizes that the judicial function is to
determine whether, in the light of exceptional circumstances, justice requires a
departure from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of increased
difficulty of performance." 18 9 In this way, impracticability is a consequence of the
development of contractual flexibility that shifts away from the traditional
approach of strict enforcement of contracts; and through its doctrinal evolution,
contract disputes involving breach or non-performance are no longer as harsh and
predictable, but they certainly have become more contextual.
B. Market Changes as Supervening Event
Although these excuse doctrines rooted in impossibility and
impracticability have injected some flexibility in contracts and weakened the wall
of absolute liability for breach, courts continue to apply these doctrines with
caution and restraint. This is due to the assumption that the significance and the
instrumentality of contracts would be subverted by every changed circumstance
that comes along to add new burdens on performance. 190 Along this vein, one
"off-limits" supervening event category affected by changed circumstances that
has not traditionally received much success for discharging parties in
impracticability has been that of changed economic and market conditions that
makes performance onerous. Official Comment 4 to U.C.C. Section 2-615, on
impracticability, states that
[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise
in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the
essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse
in the market itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of
188 See Richard S. Wirtz, Revolting Developments, 91 OR. L. REv. 325, 355 (2012) ("The law of
impracticability, the courts and commentators say over and over, is rooted in considerations of
fairness.") (footnote omitted).
189 Farnsworth, supra note 42, at § 9.6.
190 See FERRIELL, supra note 158, at § 13.03 ("The doctrines of impossibility, impracticability,
and frustration of purpose must be carefully constrained if contracts are to retain their meaning and
utility. If every change of circumstance that made performance more difficult, expensive, or
disadvantageous provided an excuse for nonperformance, contracts would become meaningless.").
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business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are
intended to cover. 191
Similarly, Restatement section 261 comment b also excludes such cases from
generally excusing parties' nonperformance by preventing changed market
conditions from being considered an event which supervenes the basic
assumptions of the parties: "The continuation of existing market conditions and
of the financial situation of the parties are ordinarily not such assumptions, so that
mere market shifts or financial inability do not usually effect discharge under the
rule." 19 2 According to some sources, it seems that changed market conditions
could be a supervening event; however, in usual cases, it is not enough of a
supervening event to warrant a relief based on impracticability. 193
Regarding the Great Recession, this conventional view of impracticability
makes this doctrine less salient for litigants trying to escape the liabilities of
default because performance was made more difficult because of the 2008
economic crisis. For example, Danielle Kie Hart has reiterated the categorical
harshness of using excuse doctrines to combat default issues during the housing
crisis, in stating that "[i]t is black letter contract law that changes in a market do
not affect the basic assumption on which contracts are made." 19 4 And yet, there
are those who disagree and are not quite ready to shut out flexibility in the rule.
For instance, Cohen underscores that, within the same part of comment b in
Restatement Section 261 quoted above, "the Restatement explicitly leaves some
wriggle room" regarding impracticability and changing market conditions. 19 5
Specifically, he notes two sentences from Section 261 comment b: "In borderline
cases this [basic assumption that does not account for changed market conditions]
is sufficiently flexible to take account of factors that bear on a just allocation of
risk. The fact that the event was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not
necessarily compel a conclusion that its non-occurrence was not a basic
assumption."196 This particular declaration in Section 261 comment b leads
Cohen to think that the categorical off-limits approach for applying
191 U.C.C. § 2-615 (2016) cmt. 4.
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979) § 261 cmt. b (referencing id. at 261 cmt. c; id.
at 265 cmt. a).
193 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 42, at § 9.6 (noting that the U.C.C. gives an "ambivalent
answer" as to how to determine increased costs as a reason for applying impracticability in a
contract defense and that courts "have generally concluded that the additional expense, even if
traceable to an identifiable supervening event, does not rise to the level of impracticability.").
194 Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,
81(2011).
195 Cohen, supra note 29, at 55.
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 192.
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impracticability in situations where changing economic and market conditions-
such as the Great Recession-is a bit spurious. 197
1. Aluminum Company ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc.198
To bolster Cohen's sentiment, there have been cases that have attempted
to exercise that potential wriggle room in the impracticability doctrine by relying
on changed market conditions as the supervening event that renders performance
impracticable. The most well-known case that received favorable judicial
treatment in this endeavor has been the 1980 federal district court case, Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc. Technically, the breaching party here,
ALCOA, succeeded under an application of the mistake doctrine, but the court
went further in its opinion to review changed market conditions as a supervening
event for a favorable application of impracticability. 199 In the case itself, ALCOA
contracted in 1967 with Essex to produce aluminum for Essex on a long-term
basis with the agreed price of the aluminum associated with the price of the
aluminum on Wholesale Price Index.20 0 Despite both parties' original intentions
that this formula would serve as an objective measure of increases in ALCOA's
non-labor costs of producing the aluminum, 201 the index failed to accurately track
the actual cost of production and ALCOA's costs were subject to increases in
inflation due to OPEC hikes in oil prices and unanticipated pollution control
expenses.20 2 Accordingly, ALCOA's losses climbed from $3.4 million in 1977 to
$8.6 million in 1989, and would have eventually climbed to a possible total loss
of $75 million or more by the end the contract with Essex. 2 03 ALCOA
subsequently sued to have the contract equitably modified and reformed.204 While
mutual mistake was the grounds that allowed the court to provide relief for
ALCOA,20 5 the court felt obliged to discuss its positions on ALCOA's
predicament based on theories of impracticability and frustration of purpose,
197 Cohen, supra note 29, at 55.
198 Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
199 Id. at 70-76.
200 Id. at 56.
201 See id. ("ALCOA contends that this charge was intended by the parties to reflect actual
changes in the cost of the non-labor items utilized by ALCOA in the production of aluminum from
alumina at its Warrick, Indiana smelting plant. In count one of this suit ALCOA asserts that the
WPI used in the Molten Metal Agreement was in fact incapable of reasonably reflecting changes in
the non-labor costs at ALCOA's Warrick, Indiana smelting plant and has in fact failed to so reflect
such changes.").
202 Id. at 58.
203 Id. at 56-59.
204 Id. at 57; see also Cohen, supra note 29, at 50 ("[ALCOA] went to court seeking equitable
modification of the contract price.").
205 Aluminum Co. of America, 499 F. Supp. at 60-70.
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which the court deemed as doctrines that "overlap in time" with mutual
mistake. 206
The court examined how the doctrine of impracticability likely would not
excuse a breach due to a minor fluctuation of the market, but rather for "some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance." 2 0 7
Upon such examination, the court sided with ALCOA and its impracticability
claim, citing that the market influences were great enough to fall within that
unforeseen contingency.208 Part of the court's rationale was based on weighing
the gravity of burden and loss on ALCOA's continuing performance (here, in the
tens of millions) because of the supervening changes in the marketplace
stemming from OPEC and other controlling costs. 2 09 The court believed not only
was there some authority and guidance from the U.C.C., Restatement, and others
to direct its reasoning toward considering this change in market conditions as
supervening, it also relied on some slippage from previous impossibility and
impracticability cases that had precluded changed market forces from allowing
the defense but still left room for flexibility-or perhaps, applying Cohen's
words, "wriggle room. "210 In general, it seems that supervening changes in
market forces can be enough to warrant impracticability if the focus loosens the
restrictive take on risk allocations generally assumed between parties in fixed
contracts as well as increases its take on the pragmatic effects-i.e. the severe
losses and costs in a party's continued performance-of keeping parties tethered
in an agreement affected by such market changes. 211 In illustrating its reasoning,
the court's flexibility should not have been surprising given its favorable
rendering of ALCOA's mutual mistake claim, but expected because of its explicit
observation that the evolution of impracticability is only recent-implying an
206 Id. at 70-71.
207 Id. at 74 (citing U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017)).
208 Id. at 76.
209 Id. at 72-74.
210 Id. at 72-73 (court discussing official commentary from the U.C.C. Restatement, and Corbin on
Contracts as pertaining to when burden on performance is so out of the ordinary that it would
render performance sufficiently impracticable); see also id. (court distinguishing ALCOA's
burdens and losses as being more severe than previous unsuccessful cases of impossibility and/or
impracticability based on changed market forces, such as Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d
312 (D.C.Cir.1966); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 989
(E.D.Pa.1975); E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Maple
Farms, Inc. v. City Sch. Dist., 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1974); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas
Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978)).
211 See id. at 76 (distinguishing cases and finding that risk of a large variation between the index
and actual costs due to changing market forces "was unforeseeable in a commercial sense and was
not allocated to ALCOA in the contract"); see also id. at 73 (finding that "the increase in
[ALCOA's] cost of performance is severe enough to warrant relief").
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ongoing and still advancing nature. 2 12 And in this way, that "recent" evolution
afforded some flexibility over formalism in ALCOA's case.
On the whole, most courts after the ALCOA decision have declined to
follow its reasoning in regards to changed market conditions.2 13 Commentators
have also been vocal about its practical application and its place in the
development of the doctrine in modem contract law.214 But the case has yet to be
overruled.2 15 Indeed, while the appeal to the Third Circuit was pending, ALCOA
and Essex settled the dispute and renegotiated their original agreement; the
ALCOA holding was never put into effect. 216 For better or worse, however, the
case offers a less restricting insight as to how a severe market fluctuation could
render onerous the performance of one party in a long-term contract and allow
flexibility to alleviate default-one that aims for developing flexibility within the
permission of the doctrine. 2 17 Even scholars who may scorn the decision or
downplay its precedential value have recognized the case for its innovation.2 18 In
this way, ALCOA and its regard for the impracticability doctrine bears continual
revisiting by courts, practitioners, and scholars alike.
Unlike those who emphatically deny any wriggle room whatsoever for
changed market conditions in the impracticability doctrine, and rejects such
application to defaults in the Great Recession, Cohen finds contrariwise. Cohen
212 See, e.g., id. at 73 ("The doctrine of impracticability of the new Restatement is one of recent
evolution in the law.").
213 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 52 (footnote omitted) ("ALCOA is a controversial decision;
despite the great uproar (and, in some quarters, hope) when it was first decided, it has rarely been
relied on by courts since, either in its expansive view of excuse doctrine or in its assertive approach
to remedy.").
214 See, e.g., Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of Commercial
Impracticability, 13 U.N.H.L. REV. 1, 26 (2015) (noting that, while in practice ALCOA's equitable
allocation of loss analysis has basis under U.C.C. section 2-615, "it is an unrealistic remedial
framework."); see also John D. Wladis, Impracticability As RiskAllocation: The Effect of Changed
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REv. 503, 586 n.333
(1988) (noting that with some scholars, "[t]he Alcoa opinion was characterized as having the
precedential value of a law review article") [hereinafter Wladis].
215 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 52 ("Nevertheless, ALCOA has never been overruled and
remains available as a usable precedent, though of course it is only a district court opinion from a
single jurisdiction.").
216 See Wladis, supra note 214, at 586 n.333 (noting that as the case was being appealed to the
Third Circuit, the parties settled prior to a decision); see also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical
View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465, 476 (1985) ("[T]he trial judge's decision never went into
effect as the case was settled. The parties renegotiated their arrangement").
217 Camero, supra note 214, at 26 (observing that the ALCOA court reached its decision with
guidance and support from the U.C.C. on "us[ing] equitable principles in furtherance of
commercial standards and good faith") (quoting U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM'N 2017)).
218 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 216, at 476 (calling the ALCOA decision and its results
"innovative, and perhaps offensive").
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finds that impracticability under Restatement 261's incarnation would have
tolerated the crisis as a supervening event, enough to help establish
impracticability. For instance, he notes that Section 261 focuses primarily on
events rather than on risk allocation. 21 9 For that reason,
"[i]f the relevant event, broadly defined, is the financial crisis,
then that event involved the realization of multiple risks. Thus,
not only did the financial crisis lead to declining home prices, but
it also led to an economic downturn and high unemployment,
making it difficult for many homeowners to make their loan
payments." 2 2 0
But comment b to Section 261 does inject risk allocation into the equation of
assessing the parties' basic assumption, and thus, although risk might not have a
predominant mentioning, it still has a place within the Restatement's
impracticability rule.221 Cohen's notice of risk assessment in Restatement § 261 is
one reason why he finds ALCOA as a case expanding the wriggle room within
impracticability:
The ALCOA case . .. took advantage of the doctrinal flexibility
and also found that performance had become impracticable
because the nonoccurrence of the failure of the price index was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made, and ALCOA
did not assume the risk of deviation beyond the reasonable limits
of risk.222
But that is not the only potential that Cohen sees in ALCOA. In the court's
application of the mistake doctrine to excuse parties, he justifies the district court
holding by understanding it through an equitable lenses-peering into a situation
where ALCOA and Essex had mistakenly crafted and relied on an index that later
did not match market conditions affected by OPEC, and presented Essex an
opportunistic hand over ALCOA in Essex's long-term purchase of aluminum at a
very advantageous fixed price. 223 That equitable perspective affords ALCOA
219 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 56 ("Section 261 does not talk in terms of risks, but in terms of an
event.").
220 Id.
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("In borderline
cases this criterion is sufficiently flexible to take account of factors that bear on a just allocation of
risk.").
222 Cohen, supra note 29, at 56 n.144.
223 Id. at 51-52 ("As the market price of aluminum rose over the term of the contract, Essex resold
millions of pounds of the aluminum it acquired from ALCOA on the open market, rather than
using the aluminum internally, at a price greatly exceeding the price Essex paid to ALCOA. The
court mentions this fact only to show how far the price index had strayed from market conditions.
But if the court is correct that the purpose of the contract was to assure Essex of a long-term supply
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flexibility in mistake and the other excuse doctrines, such as impracticability:
"Understood this way, ALCOA is a case in which the court was willing to
interpret the mistake doctrine (and the other excuse doctrines) broadly because
Essex's relative fault was more blameworthy than ALCOA's." 2 2 4 Nevertheless,
Cohen's observations here demonstrates that some tension exists between the
traditional rule and the application of impracticability in situations arising from
changed market conditions.
2. Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative v. John Hancock Life
Insurance Company225
Although the doctrinal restraints for using impracticability with changed
market conditions had staved off its uses by defaulting homeowners during the
Great Recession, there was a case decided in 2008 that relied on impracticability
based on the severity of the economic downturn. In Hoosier Energy Rural Elec.
Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Hoosier Energy Rural Electric
Cooperative ("Hoosier Energy") sued to enjoin John Hancock Life Insurance
Company ("John Hancock") from asserting that Hoosier Energy defaulted on a
lease deal that the two struck shortly before the Great Recession.22 6 Hoosier relied
on the impracticability defense and, like ALCOA, it was granted its relief based
on impracticability. 2 2 7 In 2002, Hoosier Energy entered into a sale-in-lease-out
("SILO") transaction whereby Hoosier Energy leased specific assets at its electric
generating plant to John Hancock Life Insurance ("John Hancock"). The
transaction was for a sixty-three year term (which is past their useful life), and for
of aluminum for its own manufacturing operations, similar to a requirements contract, then
significant reselling by Essex could be viewed as an opportunistic, bad faith attempt to take
advantage of the then-favorable contract price, contrary to what the parties originally
contemplated. It is one thing to argue that ALCOA should bear the risk of the flawed index it
drafted; it is another to argue that ALCOA should bear the risk that Essex would opportunistically
take advantage of ALCOA's miscalculation by taking more aluminum than it needed and reselling
it") (footnotes omitted).
224 Id. at 52 (footnote omitted); see also id. ("What ... is the proposition for which the case (at
least according to its own reasoning) stands? One way to characterize ALCOA's holding is that
when contracting parties rely on a sophisticated, but flawed, financial formula to make a long-term
contract, and that formula fails for unforeseeable reasons to track economic conditions in the way
that the parties expected, the court may use the mutual mistake doctrine to excuse performance and
reformulate the contract terms to better match the underlying contractual assumptions.").
225 Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 2d 919
(S.D. Ind. 2008), aff'd, 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
226 Id. at 921-22.
227 Id. at 921 (granting injunctive relief to Hoosier); see also id. at 931 ("Hoosier Energy would
also have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits on its theory of temporary
commercial impracticability.").
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a one-time payment of $300 million.2 28 Immediately, John Hancock leased back
the same assets to Hoosier Energy for a thirty-year term in exchange for periodic
lease payments.2 2 9 Subsequently, Hoosier Energy saved nearly $20 million for the
sixty-three year lease-out and deposited $278 million with various Ambac
entities, which had commitments to make regular lease payments to John
Hancock, on Hoosier Energy's behalf.230
The parties had intended for the SILO transaction to permit John Hancock
to claim itself the "owner" of the plant for tax purposes.8 9 As a result, John
Hancock could then claim tax deductions in the tens of millions of dollars-
which were deductions Hoosier Energy could not use because it, as a cooperative,
did not profit significantly from selling electricity to its members.23 1 But, because
Hoosier Energy made additional payments to Ambac, it shored up the control
Hoosier Energy would retain over its electricity generating plant.2 32 During this
time, the IRS had begun to stop allowing income tax deductions to participants in
SILO transactions.23 3 As a result, the SILO transaction between Hoosier Energy
and John Hancock allegedly lacked economic substance; this is because Hoosier
Energy would keep control of the plant while John Hancock would be without the
rights, responsibilities, and risks usually connected to asset ownership.234 In other
words, this SILO transaction appeared to be an abusive tax shelter.23 5
If Hoosier Energy defaulted under the lease, the SILO transaction
required Hoosier Energy to obtain a credit default swap ("CDS") from Ambac
and provide it to John Hancock as further assurance of timely lease payments and
protection..23 6 Additionally, in the event that Hoosier Energy defaulted, John
Hancock could seek from Ambac a termination payment and Ambac,
accordingly, could purchase a "closely parallel" CDS contract from Hoosier
Energy.23 7 John Hancock would also receive a surety bond from Ambac.2 38 John
Hancock added further protections by requiring that the CDS be provided by a
party with a credit rating no lower than "AA." 2 39 If Ambac's rating dipped under
"AA," then Hoosier Energy would have sixty days to replace Ambac with another
insurer that had a satisfying "AA" rating.240 If Hoosier Energy did not do so, then




232 See id. at 922-23.
233 Id. at 923.
234 See id. at 924, 927-28.
235 Id. at 923-24.
236 Id. at 922.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 See id. at 922, 924.
240 See id. at 924.
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John Hancock could declare that failure as a default and seek the termination
payment from Ambac. 2 4 1 Furthermore, according to the logic of the SILO terms,
Ambac could seek a substantial payment from Hoosier Energy under its parallel
CDS contract.242
Then the mortgage crisis occurred, creating what the court called a "credit
'tsunami,' " (citing Alan Greenspan's famous words) fundamentally contributing
to the downgrade of Ambac's credit rating in June 2008.243 The credit crisis also
"made it impossible-or nearly impossible-for Hoosier Energy to find a
substitute for Ambac with a sufficient rating, on time, and at any price" within the
required sixty days. 2 44 Hoosier Energy received a thirty-day extension, found a
substitute for Ambac, and received an additional twenty-day extension despite
requesting an additional ninety days to close the transaction. 2 45 Refusing to
extend the time any further, John Hancock declared a default against Hoosier
Energy and sought a $120 million termination payment from Ambac.246 Because
the termination payment by Ambac to John Hancock would have led to a similar
payment obligation from Hoosier Energy, forcing it into bankruptcy,2 47 the
district court held that this bankruptcy would amount to an irreparable harm to
Hoosier Energy's position. 248 The court also sided with Hoosier Energy's
argument that the CDS contracts were part of an abusive and illegal SILO
transaction that had no economic substance. 2 49 And because of the global credit
crisis and the Great Recession, the court also found that Hoosier Energy could
successfully assert a temporary commercial impracticability defense with respect
to its obligation to secure the substitute CDS contract within the sixty-day term;
so, Hoosier Energy should have been given more time. 250 As a result of these
findings, the court granted Hoosier Energy's preliminary injunction claim to
enjoin John Hancock and Ambac from asserting default and seeking termination
payments.2 51
The district court's favorable reasoning for Hoosier Energy's temporary
impracticability argument was based in part on the court's interpretation of the
Great Recession's severity:
241 Id. at 922.
242 id.
243 See id. at 924.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 924-25.
246 Id. at 926.
247 Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-1560-DFH-
DML, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100353, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2008).
248 Id. at *13-14.
249 See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 588 F. Supp. 2d at 926-28.
250 See id. at 930-33.
251 Id. at 935.
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If the nature and scope of the credit crisis were more limited or a
mere economic downturn, John Hancock's argument that the
crisis was foreseeable or that Hoosier Energy should have
protected itself better might be more persuasive. However, the
credit crisis facing the world's economies in recent months is
unprecedented and was not foretold by the world's preeminent
economic experts. The crisis certainly was not anticipated in
2002, when the deal between Hoosier Energy, Ambac, and John
Hancock was being finalized. Retrospect will not assist John
Hancock here, nor will an assertion that it was Hoosier Energy's
responsibility to prepare for and guard against any imaginable
commercial calamity. After all, "foreseeable" is different from
"conceivable." 25 2
The court focused on the severity of the crisis rather than any existing risk
allocation that the parties might have created in the SILO transaction against an
event that might have caused Ambac's credit rating to dip and Hoosier Energy's
difficulty in finding a timely replacement: "Hoosier Energy has come forward
with evidence indicating that the obstacles it faced were not specific to Ambac
but were the product of the credit crisis that effectively but temporarily froze the
market for comparable credit products at any price."253 Severity of the Great
Recession seemed to override an assessment in calculating and allotting risk;
rather, "[t]hose effects were not anticipated and could not have been guarded
against." 2 54 This move toward emphasizing the gravity of the event as the reason
to abandon evaluation of parties' risk allocation at the outset of the SILO
transaction echoes Cohen's observation about the Restatement § 261's emphasis
on supervening events rather than risks. Here, according to this court, the "credit
tsunami" during the Great Recession was a market change that was supervening
enough to render impracticability available to Hoosier Energy against a
declaration of default.
However, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit did not
favorably take the district court's temporary impracticability reasoning.2 55 Unlike
the district court, Judge Easterbrook's opinion lacked acknowledgement of the
supervening nature of the 2008 credit crisis. There were certainly no tsunamis
here in the Seventh Circuit's decision: "Downturns and cartels are types of things
252 Id. at 932 (quoting Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Grp./Equip, Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d
434, 439 (W.D. Pa. 2000)) (citations omitted).
253 Id.
254 Id.




that happen, against which contracts can be designed." 2 56 Rather, Judge
Easterbrook focused on risks, and that approach permitted him to cast a formalist
hand in doubting the district court's application of impracticability based on
economic and market changes. The significant part of a correct impracticability
analysis-in Easterbrook's view-would have likely been the adherence to risk
allocation of changed economic conditions:
When they do happen, the contractual risk allocation must be
enforced rather than set aside. The district court called the credit
crunch of 2008 a "once-in-a-century" event. That's an
overstatement (the Great Depression occurred within the last 100
years, and the 2 0 th Century also saw financial crunches in 1973
and 1987), and also irrelevant. An insurer that sells hurricane or
flood insurance against a "once in a century" catastrophe, or
earthquake insurance in a city that rarely experiences tremblors,
can't refuse to pay on the ground that, when a natural event
devastates a city, its very improbability makes the contract
unenforceable. 2 5 7
Applying more heavily the risk allocation part of the impracticability calculation
would shut down Hoosier Energy's claim that the substitute arrangement was
legitimately impracticable due to the changed circumstances involving a global
credit crisis because, as Easterbrook notes,
[f]inancial distress could be and was foreseen; that's what the
credit-default swap is all about. But if no one could have foreseen
the extent of the credit crunch in 2008-and if it really made
performance impossible, a subject on which the parties
profoundly disagree-then the sort of argument that Hoosier
Energy makes could satisfy the requirements [of impracticability
under New York case law]. 258
Contrary to the district court decision in Hoosier Energy, the view here is that
changed market conditions are always possible and so parties inherently bargain
their terms according to that possibility. 2 5 9 If that is the case, then Easterbrook's
logic seems to project that this basic assumption is always on the minds of the
parties as they craft their terms in the agreement-making process, and that what
256 Id. at 728.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
259 Cf Hoosier Energy, 588 F. Supp. 2d. at 932 (noting the difference between foreseeable and
conceivable and that "[i]f 'foreseeable' is equated with 'conceivable; nothing is unforeseeable")
(quoting Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip, Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439
(W.D. Pa. 2000)).
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was foreseeable as far as the severity-or "the extent"-of the financial crisis
was concerned in Hoosier Energy was the unknown. If Hoosier Energy could
prove that the extent was not foreseeable, then impracticability would be
available. Otherwise, a formalist approach should trump any equitable means for
a party to avail itself to impracticability arguments when markets and economies
drastically change.
It seems as if the tension between the district court and Seventh Circuit
decisions here is about where to set the risk allocation. While perhaps the district
court would rather have set aside risk allocation quickly and render the global
credit crisis an event sufficiently supervening to allow flexibility, 2 6 0 the Seventh
Circuit was not quite ready to give it up and instead places risk allocation not in
the foreseeability of a global credit crisis in 2008 (because Easterbrook deems
that this was foreseeable), but in whether its severity was foreseeable and
continue the gamble there. Still, despite such heavy and nuanced criticism, Judge
Easterbrook affirmed the lower court's decision, abiding by the deferential
standard of review.261
In Hoosier Energy, it seems as if insisting on risk allocation serves the
formalism's purpose in denying impracticability, while building up the severity of
the crisis-in essence, establishing that it is sufficiently supervening-triggers
equitable concerns and flexibility. Focusing on risk allocation promotes academic
back-in-time exercises while equitable concerns are aimed more at pragmatically
addressing the situation.
3. Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. AmericaS262
Another case, such as Hoosier Energy, that also took place during the
time of the Great Recession, but hits closer to home in the real estate realm-
albeit commercial, not residential-is one that involved real estate mogul and
now U.S. president Donald Trump. In February 2005, Donald Trump and his real
estate development company entered into two loan agreements-first, a
construction loan agreement for $640 million from Deutsche Bank and a
mezzanine loan for $130 million from Fortress Credit Corp.263 The loans financed
264the building of a ninety-two story condo-hotel in downtown Chicago. The
260 See id. ("Retrospect will not assist John Hancock here, nor will an assertion that it was Hoosier
Energy's responsibility to prepare for and guard against any imaginable commercial calamity.
After all, 'foreseeable' is different from 'conceivable."').
261 Hoosier Energy, 582 F.3d at 730 ("Because appellate review is deferential, the district court's
understanding must prevail at the interlocutory stage.").
262 Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas No. 26841/08, 2008 WL 5789270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Queens Cnty. Dec. 4, 2008).
263 Verified Complaint at paras. 23-25, 61-63, Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, No.
26841/08, 2008 WL 5789270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Nov. 3, 2008).
264 Id. at paras. 56-57, 61.
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original maturity date was May 7, 2008 and when Trump and his company could
not repay the construction loans, he exercised a right to an extension with the
lenders for another six months, extending it to November 2008.265 Shortly before
the November deadline, Trump and his company attempted to exercise a right to
another extension, but the lenders rejected it.2 66 Both Trump and the lenders sued
in separate actions in New York state.267
The condo market remained in a deep slump through 2008, and by the
time of the November extension deadline, sales of the prospective building units
were stagnant and the lenders were not keen on making or refinancing the
loans. 2 68 Deutsche Bank's lawsuit demanded that Trump fulfill a $40 million
personal guaranty that he committed to for the timely payment of the construction
loan. 2 69 Trump's lawsuit relied on an excuse argument that blamed the Great
Recession for hindering the fulfillment of the bargain.2 70 In detail, he invoked the
force majeure clause in the construction loan agreement with Deutsche Bank,
claiming that the Great Recession was a force maj eure event that ultimately made
it an impossibility to pay back the loan or honor other substitute transactions.27 1
Force majeure events-those "that can be neither anticipated nor
controlled" 272 and "includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods and hurricanes) and
acts of people (e.g., riots, strikes, and wars)" 273 -have significant presence in the
impracticability doctrine. Both deal with changed circumstances excusing parties'
274
performance in an agreement when performance becomes burdensome. In
265 Id. at paras. 81-82.
266 Id. at paras. 10, 83.
267 See generally id. at paras. 104-67 (Trump's Verified Complaint listing ten causes of actions);
see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Trump, No. 603483/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens
Cnty. 2008).
268 Verified Complaint at paras. 4-8, 79, Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, No.
26841/08, 2008 WL 5789270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Nov. 3, 2008); see also LAWRENCE A.
CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR CONTRACTS AND WHY
THEY MATTER 81 (2d ed. 2012) ("By the end of 2008, Trump had only sold condos netting him
$204 million, along with others under contract that would yield another $353 million.").
269 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment in Lieu of
Complaint at 2-3, 13, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Trump, No. 603483/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Queens Cnty. 2008).
270 Verified Complaint at 94, 98, 110-14, Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, No.
26841/08, 2008 WL 5789270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Nov. 3, 2008).
271 Id. at paras. 94, 98.
272 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 155, at 761.
273 Id.
274 H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships Under the Uniform
Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. REV. 379, 399 (1991) ("Force majeure is most
similar to the doctrine of impracticability because both doctrines allow relief when a supervening
event has seriously disrupted performance to such a degree that performance would place an undue
burden on one of the parties or to such an extent that the underlying object of the contract is no
longer practicable.") (footnote omitted).
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addition, according to one source, their historical evolutions in the law are not so
subtly intertwined: "Much of the jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of
force majeure clauses is rooted in the cases addressing the doctrines of
impossibility and commercial impracticability (including Section 2-615 of the
U.C.C.)."275 Other studies comparing force majeure clauses and impracticability
align with this observation by likening force majeure as a category of what
eventually was the supervening force in impracticability:
[Force majeure] started off as a contractual synonym for the
general common law doctrine of (physical) impossibility. Force
majeure was considered an excuse for nonperformance due to
impossibility to perform. When there was an 'Act of God or the
King's Enemies,' performance could not be completed and the
promisor was held to be excused.27 6
At trial, the force majeure clause represents the parties' explicit risk allocation of
a supervening event's occurrence; whereas parties without a force majeure clause
would have to establish risk assessment as a fact to illustrate successfully that
impracticability applied to their non-performance:
The force majeure excuse arises directly from the contract
between the parties and represents their agreement about how to
allocate the risks of future adverse events. The section 2-615
excuse, on the other hand, arises from the statutory determination
that because the parties did not allocate a particular risk, the court
should perform that task for them by excusing a party. 2 77
In that way, impracticability has been labeled as having a "gap-filling" function
when compared to force majeure clauses. 278 A more subtle difference-and
indeed an interesting one-arises in the way a court might treat a force majeure
clause, which if valid and effectively invoked would be subject to formalist
enforcement under pact sunt servanda. Meanwhile, a favorable finding of
impracticability may have to rely on equitable principles. For instance, "[i]n a
275 Jay D. Kelley, So What's Your Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J. OIL
GAS &ENERGYL. 91, 93 (2007).
276 P.J.M. Declercq, Modern Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in Situations
of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & CoM. 213, 214-15 (1995); see also William Cary
Wright, Force Majeure Delays, 26 CONSTRUCTION L., 33, (2006) ("The doctrine of force majeure
has developed, generally, from 'physical impossibility' to 'frustration of purpose' and more
recently to 'commercial impracticability."').
277 Christopher J. Costantini, Comment, Allocating Risk in Take-or-Pay Contracts: Are Force
Majeure and Commercial Impracticability the Same Defense?, 42 Sw. L.J. 1047, 1064 (1989)
(footnotes omitted).
278 Declercq, supra note 276, at 229.
[Vol. 1882
Why Flexibility Matters
force majeure clause the parties have the ability to deal in their own way with
problems caused by changed circumstances." 279 If an event arose within the
clause and an affected party invoked it, the clause would be enforced. On the
other hand, if parties without a force majeure clause claim excuse in a judicial
proceeding, then a successful impracticability defense would promulgate
flexibility and excuse from less stringent perspectives on contracts. For instance,
"Section 2-615 embodies the policy that, when egregious and unforeseen
circumstances exist, fairness dictates that the court excuse the burdened party." 2 8 0
In a case involving a force majeure clause, any similar impracticability-type
decision-making regarding excuse might delay the enforcement of a force
majeure clause if an interpretation problem arose over whether an event or effect
is covered by one of the categories listed in a force majeure clause. 28 1 Otherwise,
courts tend to confine enforcement of a force majeure clause to those events listed
and will likely not create new categories. 282
Trump's situation, in which he raised the financial crisis of the Great
Recession as qualifying under the force majeure clause of the construction loan
agreement with Deutsche Bank, falls somewhere between the categories above,
but likely in its own category.283 Specifically the complaint couches the financial
crisis within the catch-all event category in the clause by directing attention to
subsection (xi), allowing "any other event of circumstance not within the
reasonable control of Borrower or any Trade Contractor." 28 4 Likely, this move
was controversial-not only within impracticability cases as it harkens to non-
standard cases, such as ALCOA and Hoosier Energy-but also as far as court
interpretation of catch-all provisions in force majeure clauses goes. As one
commentator has noted, "[t]he amount of detail included in the specific list of
279 Id.
280 Costantini, supra note 277, at 1064 (referencing Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315).
281 See Declercq, supra note 276, at 226 ("When interpreting force majeure clauses which contain
terms related to commercial impracticability, i.e., a 'failure of markets,' courts tend to look partly
to the doctrine of commercial impracticability and then interpret the terms in the clause in a
manner consistent with that doctrine."); see also Kelley, supra note 275, at 92 ("[A] court
interpreting a force majeure clause may, in certain circumstances, impose requirements similar to
those applicable to the common law and statutory excuses, even if a literal reading of the clause
might lead to a different interpretation."); see also id. at 99 ("Texas courts have taken the approach
that, in interpreting force majeure clauses, the actual terms of the clause are controlling, and only
when those terms are vague will the courts turn to common law to fill in the gaps.") (referencing
Sun Operating Ltd. P'ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998); Hydrocarbon Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 436 (Tex. App. 1993); Tex. City Ref. v. Conoco, Inc.,
767 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. App. 1989)).
282 Wright, supra note 276, at 34 ("Although it is true that many force majeure clauses tend to
include acts of man such as riots and wars, courts tend to narrowly interpret such language and
limit its application to the events specifically listed.").
283 Verified Complaint, supra note 263, at para. 87.
284 id.
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events constituting force majeure is one of the most important considerations in
drafting a force majeure clause because reliance on a catch-all phrase is generally
more difficult and in some cases impossible." 285 The same commentator quoted a
line of instruction regarding catch-all phrases in force majeure clauses from Kel
Kim Corporation v. Century Markets, Inc.,286 a notable New York precedent
"analogous" to Trump's, 28 7 which states "[o]rdinarily, only if the force majeure
clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a party's performance
will that party be excused." 28 8 Trump's force majeure clause did not include
changes in the market or economic conditions as one of the listed categories. 289
Hence, there was a leap of imagination and interpretation required for succeeding
on that claim. In fact, as Lawrence Cunningham observes, "[t]o make his claim
persuasive, his loan agreement's force majeure clause would have to include
something like: 'riots, insurrection, war, adverse weather, Acts of God, national
financial crisis of magnitude unprecedented in modem time, or some other
similar causes.' "290 And Deutsche Bank's willingness to include that event would
have been unlikely at the outset of the deal.291 Interestingly, had Trump also
alleged commercial impracticability in the alternative, and not merely excuse
under the force majeure clause, he could have made the same arguments using the
Great Recession and encountered more wiggle room in the adjudication.
Despite those challenges, Trump and his company made a force majeure
claim hinged on the Great Recession and tried to access flexibility to excuse the
defaulting behavior on the construction loan. Beyond alleging that his lenders had
285 Kelley, supra note 275, at 98.
286 Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987).
287 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 84 ("Donald Trump's position was analogous to Kel-
Kim's.").
288 Kel Kim Corp., 519 N.E.2d at 296 (citations omitted); see also Kelley, supra note 275, at 98-99
(quoting the same passage).
289 According to Trump's Verified Complaint, the following, other than the catch-all provision,
are events under his force majeure clause:
(i) acts of declared or undeclared war by a foreign enemy oi terrorist acts; (ii)
riots, civil commotion or insurrection; (iii) casualty or condemnation; (iv) fire,
floods, hurricanes or other casualty; (v) earthquakes; (vi) acts of God; (vii)
governmental preemption. in the case of a national emergency; (viii)
unavailability of labor or materials to the extent not within the reasonable
control of Borrower or any Trade Contractor; (ix) strikes, lockouts or other
labor trouble, (x) the suspension of governmental operations; which suspension
affects real estate development in the City of Chicago generally and is not
particular to Borrower or the Project.
Verified Complaint, supra note 263, para. 87; see also Exhibit 1 at 18, Notice of Motion for
Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint, Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Trump (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Queens Co. Nov. 26, 2008) (No. 603483/2008).
290 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 84.
291 Id. ("[B]anks do not agree to that kind of risk allocation.").
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contributed to making his performance difficult, 29 2 the complaint relentlessly
characterized the severity of the Great Recession to attempt a convincing
narrative worthy of excuse. The complaint acknowledged that the Great
Recession "ar[ose] from the unprecedented dysfunctionality and seizure of credit
markets ,"293 and encompassed also "the sharp decline in real estate" 29 4 and "the
unprecedented volatility of the stock market." 29 5 Like Hoosier Energy, the
complaint here also quotes Alan Greenspan's infamous remark about the credit
crisis as a " 'once-in-a-century credit tsunami' "296 and slyly uses Deutsche
Bank's own apocalyptic words about the Great Recession against the bank.29 7 The
complaint even alleges that the "severe downturn" 29 8 and "[t]hese highly adverse
market conditions were compounded by the actions of Deutsche Bank and other
institutional lenders, in creating the current financial crisis, which has sent the
country and the world into the worst downward economic spiral since the Great
Depression. "299 All of which were characteristics of a grave change in economic
conditions that made his repayment and performance impossible. 300
Eventually, the two competing lawsuits were merged into one. 3 0 1 But the
case never went to trial; Trump "got accommodations from Deutsche Bank in the
repayment schedule amid the Great Recession, stretching the case out through
settlement in July 2010, after the financial storm passed." 3 0 2 One can speculate
about the relative positions of Trump and the lenders and the reasons why they
settled. A New York Times article on the dispute laid out some reasonable
assumptions that risks to Deutsche Bank if construction was not completed would
292 See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 263, at paras. 90-93.
293 Id. at para. 94.
294 Id. at para. 85.
295 Id.
296
296 Id. at para. 86.
297 Id. (noting that Great Recession was what Deutsche Bank had described as event where "the
global financial system has been pushed to the brink of the collapse") (quotations omitted).
298 Id. at para. 79.
299 id.
300 Id. at paras. 94-95, 98.
301 See Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 887 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (App. Div. 2009)
("The Supreme Court, Queens County, directed the two actions to be jointly tried.").
302 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 84. This settlement later became part of a larger conflict of
interest problem for Donald Trump after he became the 45th U.S. President in 2017. See Keri
Geiger, Greg Farrell & Sarah Mulholland, Trump May Have a $300 Million Conflict of Interest
With Deutsche Bank, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2016, 7:35 AM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-12-22/deutsche-bank-s-reworking-a-big-trump-loan-as-inauguration-nears
[hereinafter Geiger, et al.,]; see also Ben Protess, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Jesse Drucker, Big
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make "[s]ome sort of settlement seem[] wise." 303 As the article noted further,
Trump had an obligation of $40 million out of the $334 million outstanding on
the loan, while the rest was owed by his development company and was not
guaranteed personally by Trump.304 Consequently,
[i]f Mr. Trump was forced to pay the $40 million, he would be
unlikely to permanently lose it, since his company would owe it to
him. If the project went under, his claim would rank higher than
the Fortress loan. Deutsche will make nothing from its investment
in the junior loan if Mr. Trump does lose any money. 3 0 5
These risks likely pressured Deutsche Bank to make efforts to complete the
building project of property-even advancing $13 million to pay contractors
while the suit was pending.30 6 Curiosities will likely never cease over the merits
of Trump's changed circumstances argument using the Great Recession to excuse
his delay in repayment. The Great Recession has passed and envisioning the
success of his force majeure defense seems analogous to an ex post dissection of
risk allocation in the choice of terms parties had elected in negotiating a deal. We
will never fully know how a court would have sided, but it certainly would have
been quite the story: "If Mr. Trump manages to persuade a judge that the current
crisis provides him with a good reason not to meet his obligations, he will have
some great tales to tell in his next book." 30 7
But Trump, characterized by Cunningham as a "prolific litigant, "308 was
utilizing contractual flexibility no differently than the litigants in Hoosier Energy
and ALCOA in seeking to excuse his non-performance through changed market
conditions; in fact, Trump invoked the exact same event that Hoosier Energy and
invoking the same category of events that ALCOA had both relied on to
respectively succeed. Not to mention, Trump's defense coincided with the
bailouts of several major Wall Street Banks, all premised on the effects of the
Great Recession and how they were "too big to fail." 309 That period might have
been pragmatic and exceptional-and probably because of that, prone to some
innovation. In providing commentary on applying Hoosier Energy to Trump v.
Deutsche Bank Trust Company, Carlos Encinas explains how "Trump's force






308 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 81.
309 See, e.g., Paul R. La Monica, Lehman: Too Big to Fail?, CNN MONEY (Sept. 10, 2008, 11:11
AM EDT), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/10/markets/thebuzz/?postversion=200809 1010
(discussing the bailout for Bear Stearns and predicting the same for Lehman Brothers).
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majeure clause, and other similarly drafted force majeure clauses, could arguably
permit the borrower to use an economic downturn or economic downturn-related
event such as the 2008 credit crisis as a basis for invoking force majeure, thereby
temporarily excusing the borrower's repayment of loan funds."3 10 Generally, that
premise relies on innovation and pragmatism:
Several reasons may explain the previous inattention to economic
downturns and economic downturn-related events in force
majeure clauses. One reason could be the relative novelty of the
idea. [Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company] appears to be the
first lawsuit in which a party uses an economic downturn or
economic downturn-related event to claim force majeure under a
CRE loan agreement. The reason could also be mere
practicability; the terms economic downturn, economic crisis, and
recession are so amorphous that even economists cannot say with
certainty what they mean in real terms.3 11
As Encinas' study moves into further details, the possibility of Trump prevailing
on his excuse theory, based fundamentally on the Great Recession, seems
probable considering the case's resemblance to Hoosier Energy. Both cases also
evade some of the constraints of New York state precedent surrounding force
majeure clauses and impossibility, allowing flexibility and innovation to
effectuate the wiggle room in the wall of absolute liability-indeed, room big
enough to craft an escape for both Hoosier Energy and, likely, Trump.
Two reasons help illuminate the innovations that Hoosier Energy
provides in contrast to the existing doctrine on market fluctuations and
impracticability. First, unlike prevailing New York cases, Hoosier Energy
factually took place within a market change that was "unprecedented."3 1 2
Specifically, compared to the insurance crisis in the leading case, Kel Kim, the
Great Recession in Hoosier was indeed "far greater and far more unexpected."3 13
Secondly, unlike prevailing New York cases, where the defendants sought longer
lasting relief from excuse through changed market conditions, the relief sought in
11Hoosier was temporary.31 Both these reasons seemingly contribute to a more
favorable view of excuse through changed market conditions in Hoosier versus
existing New York case law.
310 Carlos A. Encinas, Clause Majeure?: Can a Borrower Use an Economic Downturn or
Economic Downturn-Related Event to Invoke the Force Majeure Clause in Its Commercial Real
Estate Loan Documents?, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 731, 735 (2011).
311 Id. at 735-36.
312 Id. at 759-61.
313 Id. at 760.
314 Id. at 761-62.
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Similarly, Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company exhibits differences
from how New York state would have customarily treated force majeure cases
premised on changed market conditions. Generally, force majeure clauses in New
York state are construed with the same narrowness as impracticability and
impossibility.3 15 Similar to other jurisdictions, in New York "a court may find an
implicit force majeure event exists if the clause contains a catchall phrase, but the
interpretation of such clauses must be 'confined to things of the same kind or
nature as the particular matters mentioned.' "316 Between the events listed in the
construction loan agreement's force majeure clause, its exceptions,317 and the use
of the broader descriptive words and phrases in the catch-all provision, the force
majeure clause in Trump differs enough from the clause in leading New York
precedent to allow a more expansive construction of the force majeure clause -
placing the Great Recession within the catch-all.3 18 In regards to wording, it is
both the words "any" and "reasonable" included in the phrase from Trump's
force majeure class-"any other event or circumstance not within the reasonable
control of Borrower"-versus the absence of such words in the clause at issue in
Kel Kim ("or other similar causes beyond the control of such party") that factually
distinguishes Trump from the more restrictive leading New York precedent.3 19
With the exceptions, the articulation of the "four specific exceptions bolster the
argument that the parties meant the catchall, with the modifier 'any,' to be
expansive." 320 Moreover, as Encinas notes, the force majeure clause differs from
other force majeure clauses in similar New York cases rejecting economic
315 Id. at 763.
316 Id. (quoting Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 297 (N.Y. 1987)).
317 The four exceptions in the force majeure clause in Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. America
are delineated as follows:
"Force Majeure Event" shall not include (A) inefficiencies on the part of any
Borrower Party, Construction Manager, Architect, Design Architect, Engineer,
any Trade Contractor or any design professional; (B) late performance caused
by failure to hire an adequate number of Trade Contractors, supervisors and/or
laborers or by failure to order supplies and material in an orderly or timely
fashion; (C) any cause or occurrence which any Borrower Party, Construction
Manager, Architect, Design Architect, Engineer, Trade Contractor or design
professional could reasonably control or circumvent; and (D) delays, stoppage
or any other interference with the construction of the Improvements caused by
insolvency, bankruptcy or any lack of funds of Construction Manager, any
Trade Contractor or any Borrower Party.
See Encinas, supra note 310, at 764. Complaint at para. 87, Trump v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co.
Americas (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co. Nov. 3, 2008) (No. 26841/2008); see also Exhibit 1 at 18,
Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment in Lieu of Complaint, Deutsche Bank Trust Co.
Americas v. Trump (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Co. Nov. 26, 2008) (No. 603483/2008).
318 Encinas, supra note 310, at 762-66.
319 Id. at 765-68.
320 Id. at 766.
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downturn as part of a catch-all provision because the reach and effects of the
Great Recession that Trump articulated exceeded what prior claimants had
argued. 321
Henceforth, Hoosier Energy and Trump-both cases stemming from the
same era, relying on New York law, and invoking the Great Recession as a
changed circumstance to excuse non-performance-exhibit basic factual and
circumstantial attributes that distinguish themselves from corresponding
precedents that appear more restrictive. As stated above, since New York cases
construing force majeure clauses would also resort to the manners in which
impracticability and impossibility would be construed, it would seem fitting that
Hoosier Energy would have relevance in a court's reading of the force majeure
clause in Trump. Applying Hoosier Energy to Trump in this way could provide
reasons why a court would side with Trump insofar as changed market conditions
excusing his delay in repaying Deutsche Bank. First, Hoosier would prompt
another reading in Trump that the Great Recession was meant to be included in
the catch-all provision. As noted above, the combination of an expansive catch-all
event (i.e. "any other event or circumstance not within the reasonable control of
Borrower") with the four exceptions suggests that Trump and his lenders
"intended the force majeure clause to cover foreseeable events." 32 2 Hoosier
Energy then, with its regard for the Great Recession as "unprecedented," would
provide Trump with "some precedent for finding that the national-tumed-global
credit crisis, which was related to a major economic downturn in the United
States, was both unforeseeable and of sufficient magnitude to likely provide a
basis for relief under the theory of temporary commercial impracticability."3 23 In
effect, extending Hoosier Energy's analysis of the Great Recession to the Trump
case would render a likely finding that the force majeure clause covered the
severe economic downturn that Trump articulated. Furthermore, Hoosier Energy
and Trump both sought temporary relief, rather than a more permanent excuse,
and Hoosier Energy provides some precedent for temporary excuse based on the
Great Recession.3 24 Lastly, both borrowers in Hoosier Energy and in Trump
asserted that they were acting in good faith to make sure they had "done virtually
321 Id. at 767 (distinguishing Trump v. Deutsche Bank from Urban Archeology "because Trump
was not merely asserting that the economic downturn and credit crisis caused him financial
hardship or 'a lack of funds,' but rather, he asserted that said events caused 'the unprecedented
dysfunctionality and seizure of the credit markets,' which in turn made it impossible or nearly
impossible for Trump to refinance his construction loans or for potential buyers to purchase units
in the project with credit."); see id. at 767-68 (distinguishing Trump v. Deutsche Bank from Route
6 Outparcels because Trump's inability to repay the loan was not the result of poor risk allocation
but a result of the severity of the credit markets).
322 Encinas, supra note 310, at 763, 769.
323 Id. at 769.
324 Id. at 769-70.
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everything possible to perform" before defaulting.3 25 Again, such circumstances
distinguish both cases from the leading New York cases and suggest a more
flexible decision in Trump by a New York court than the more restrictive
decisions in prior New York cases. 3 26 Certainly, we will never know what the
outcome of the Trump case would have been, but because of Hoosier and the
similarities between force majeure and impracticability, speculation favorable to
Trump shows how he could have likely prevailed.
Of course, all of these observations in this singular study of Hoosier
Energy and Trump are relegated to addressing the use of severe economic crisis
for expanding the excuse doctrines in impracticability and force majeure claims
within the context of commercial real estate loans. 32 7 What about recourses for
the kind of flexibility and innovation based on changed market conditions that
Cohen recommends, and that has been demonstrated by ALCOA, Hoosier Energy,
and Trump for defaulting homeowners during the Great Recession? Would they
be able to utilize the Great Recession in the same way? In other words, would the
circumstances of their loans avail them to similar excuse defenses based on
establishing that a market change as severe as the Great Recession to be the
supervening event that renders performance impracticable? In this context,
Cohen's observation of the defaulting homeowner from an equitable perspective
seems to beckon the answer to the question as yes:
In the mortgage context, the financial institutions behind the
subprime mortgage market expansion not only had control over,
but also exacerbated, the risks identified above. They established
a system of securitization, resecuritization, and CDSs that
ultimately destabilized the economy and contributed to a
nationwide and global recession, as well as massive defaults on
mortgages. They made it more likely that mortgages would end
up underwater by lowering required down payments, which
increased leverage and helped fuel the unsustainable housing
price bubble. And they created a massive agency problem by
putting inadequately monitored and controlled servicers, with
weak incentives and authority to respond to the crisis by making
efficient modifications, in charge of modifications. None of these
actions would be a breach of the original mortgage contract
between the homeowner and the originating lender. The financial
crisis thus presents an opportunity for a court to find an exception
325 Id. at 770.
326 See id. at 770-71.




to the general rule that financial hardship and market instability
are not grounds for excuse.3 28
Similarly, Miller has suggested that "[t]o the extent that the debate has been
framed as one of individual morality, perhaps the response of contract doctrine
should be an amendment of the current doctrine of excuse, so that homeowners
would not be technically in breach of contract in the first place."3 29 As a result,
"[t]his would force contract law to address whether the homeowners or lenders
should bear the risk of the systemic failures that lead to the crisis."330 Had that
been so, then the backdoor that was possible for Trump to temporarily escape the
liability of his non-performance could have had potential for the underwater
homeowner who had begun to fall behind in payments in 2008.
If there was one sentiment that both Trump and Deutsche Bank agreed
with during their Great Recession litigation, it was the absolution of homeowners
for defaulting on their residential mortgages. While it is not surprising to learn
that "Deutsche Bank thinks the idea that an economic downturn should free
people from the obligation to pay their debts is laughable," 331 it is curious that
when Trump was posed in an interview with a hypothetical situation of
"remorseful condominium buyers" using the Great Recession as an excuse to
walk away from their home purchases, he, like Deutsche Bank, disapproved.3 32
But his reasoning seemed less categorical than Deutsche Bank's, only because
home buyers lacked his force majeure clause. 33 3
Cunningham has noted the same discrepancy between Trump and the
"millions of other American borrowers [who] struggled to repay their real estate
loans" during the Great Recession.33 4 Although Cunningham disagrees with a
favorable reading of the force majeure clause in Trump,3 35 he gets to the actual
crux of the difference between Trump and the defaulting homeowner in the Great
Recession:
The difference between Trump and mortgage borrowers was not
the contracts or contract law, but scale. Banks compete vigorously
to get Trump's billions in business; they care proportionately less
about individual loans in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
328 Cohen, supra note 29, at 57 (emphasis added).
329 Miller, supra note 35, at 42.
330 Id.
331 Norris, supra note 303.
332 Id.
33 3 Id.
334 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 84.
335 Id. at 85.
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Thus, banks have an incentive to settle their dispute with him and
permit a change in his payment schedule.33 6
Essentially, Cunningham points to an inequality at the surface of any comparison
between the Trumps and Hoosier Energies of the world, on the one hand, and the
vast number of defaulting homeowners in the Great Recession, on the other. That
inequality, however, has deeper more profound significance for contract law as a
cumulative externality. Part IV will explore such observations more deeply.
IV. FLEXIBiLITY MATTERS
So far, this Article has involved itself descriptively on the possibilities of
bringing the impracticability doctrine, and its stipulated force majeure variant,
closer to accepting the conditions of a severe market change for rendering
contractual performance impracticable. However, the purpose of such focus has
been to illuminate the flexible innovations of contracts considering its formalist
treatment during a worldwide economic crisis, such as the Great Recession. Of
course, the efficacy of expanding the impracticability in this way is a completely
different matter. First, there is the unknown question of further negative impacts
on the economy, the American housing industry, and banking institutions in 2008
from widespread effects of excusing non-performance (even temporarily), if
defaulting homeowners could have relied on impracticability in droves. Secondly,
despite the vast light cast on the behavior of banks and lenders-both with
flagrant lending practices at the rise of the housing bubble and later with risky
securitization schemes-there is also room to blame homeowners who had taken
advantage of the subprime mortgage market, sometimes fraudulently, to finance
their home purchases.
This Article's ultimate goal is not to argue, like others such as Cohen
have, for the viability of expanding contract doctrine in significant times of crisis.
Cohen and others, as well as the cases discussed in Part III, have demonstrated
such flexible "wriggle room" and innovation in contracts doctrine can, and in
Hoosier Energy's case, did take place. Instead, the heart of the investigation in
this Part IV section examines, in terms of excusing breaching parties from their
contractual duties during the Great Recession, why certain parties had more
access to flexibility in contracts than others in order to point out that significance
and how it resonates societally for contracts on the whole.
A. Entitlements and Spillovers
While the parties in Hoosier Energy and Trump were able to make excuse
arguments based on the economic downturn respectively with enough persuasion
336 Id. (emphasis added).
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to successfully gamer favor in court or to change existing arrangements and
benefit from a reprieve through settlement, a double standard arises within the
basis of contracts when we consider that contemporaneously the same sort of
excuse and impracticability argument-essentially the same flexibility-would
not have been available for residential homeowners in default on their loans.
Overall, from a contracts perspective, flexibility and innovation in terms of fixing
their mortgage contracts seemed to have evaded homeowners in crisis during the
Great Recession.3 37 This was even so, when "residential foreclosures were the
face of the subprime crisis." 33 8 Mercy or forgiveness in contracts was apparently
not easy to come by for defaulting homeowners: "[C]onsiderable intervention by
judicial equity in the foreclosure process was possible but unrealized." 3 3 9
Several dimensions might explain and reinforce the reluctance for
exploring contractual flexibility to help homeowners in residential loan defaults
and foreclosures during the Great Recession. The first might involve the
economics and pragmatism of the judicial process itself, such as the costs
associated with litigation. Steven Bender observes that "borrowers strapped for
cash and often unemployed, struggled to find lawyers, particularly when
equitable remedies normally did not involve some financial recovery from which
the lawyer might draw a contingency fee." 340 Also, the likelihood of reported
cases detailing the specifics of lender misbehavior might have directed lenders to
settle, modify, or engage in other transactions that averted flexibility. 3 4 1
Predictability might be another, as lawyers at the time seemed to prefer "arguing
Main Street laws to stave off many subprime foreclosures, rather than resorting to
the limited and more case-specific applications of equity that often required some
lender misconduct." 3 42 Incidentally, this strategy did have a benefit in that lenders
were often negligent in pursuing foreclosures, delaying numerous foreclosures.34 3
Also, Bender notes that perspectives about the bench's rising conservativism
337 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 2-3 ("[M]ost discussions of possible responses to the financial
crisis ignore contract law. Legal scholars have generally offered legislative solutions. And
proposals for judicial involvement, most notably the settlement state attorneys general and several
banks recently concluded for various alleged fraudulent and abusive practices, do not focus on
ordinary contract law. Discussions of the crisis tend to say little about contract law, because they
simply assume that the contracts at issue should and will be strictly enforced; given that
assumption, there is not much more to say") (footnotes omitted).
338 Steven W. Bender, Equity in Times of Mortgage Crisis, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 543,
600 (2014).
339 Id. at 600-01.
340 Id. at 601.
341 See id. ("Equitable victories at the trial court level may be unreported and may have helped
prompt settlements through loan modifications, forbearance, or short sales, rather than the lender
risking an unfavorable reported decision on appeal particularly where the lender or foreclosure
claimant is accused of inequitable behavior.").
342 Id. (footnote omitted).
343 Id. (footnote omitted).
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during this time might also have interfered with innovative and creative
lawyering.144
Another dimension might be made from the straightforward observation,
that in contrast to the average American homeowner in loan default during the
Great Recession, contract breach situations in cases such as ALCOA, Hoosier
Energy, and Trump involved large corporate entities (or in the case of Trump,
entities and a real estate mogul) with considerable financial means entening in
long-term complex commercial agreements that reaped significant commercial
implications. ALCOA had its aluminum production and sale. Hoosier Energy had
its tax shelter. Trump had its ninety-two-story condominium project in downtown
Chicago. In contrast, the parties in residential home loans typically were not large
commercial or exorbitantly wealthy entities, and were usually borrowing not
singly to invest in their property purchase, but also to enjoy as residences.
Moreover, the negotiation process between these loans differed because of the
size and scope of the transaction: "Residential borrowers, particularly for
securitized loans, are handed take-it-or-leave-it loan documents, whereas
commercial borrowers often have the benefit of both legal counsel at the drafting
stage and the leverage to negotiate favorable terms, such as nonrecourse
provisions, that can supply protection in the event of default."3 45 And yet, Bender
urges that "[s]pecifically, courts should afford residential borrowers greater relief
than commercial borrowers."3 46 This assertion depends, in part, on the
observation that unlike commercial loans, "[r]esidential borrowers gain additional
standing with longevity of tenure at their residence, and also when the subject of
foreclosure is their principal residence rather than an investment property or a
vacation home."3 4 7 Hence, Bender believes that their access to flexibility was
well deserved: "Borrowers who remain in their residence rather than abandon the
property have the highest claim to equity."34 8
In the failed transactions of ALCOA, Hoosier Energy, and Trump, each
breaching party's commercial nature and the financial heft entitled them to enter
into complicated commercial agreements with other large institutions, with
millions of dollars at stake. The ALCOA-Essex deal was basically a long-term
purchase deal of aluminum worth hundreds of millions. 34 9 The transaction
between Hoosier Energy and John Hancock was a sale-in, lease-out agreement-
344 Id. ("Finally, with the increasing conservatism of judges, some may have perceived equitable
intervention as judicial policy making to be avoided given the strong presence of legislation in
dictating the foreclosure process.").




349 See ALCOA, 499 F.Supp. at 59 (Judge Teitelbaum noted in his opinion that losses to ALCOA
from 1977 to 1978 alone were $75 million.).
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albeit an illegal one-worth tens of millions at the very least. 35 0 And Trump and
Deutsche Bank had essentially a commercial construction loan valued at over
$640 million. 35 1 Their commercial nature and the high sums of money involved
entitled these borrowers to such complex agreements, likely involving some high-
stakes lawyering and negotiations-and in Hoosier Energy's case even
effectuated a tax shelter to benefit the co-op-reflecting their enormous buying
power at stake in these deals.
In this way, it is not astonishing that their failures would also be
complicated and have large consequences as well-that there would be symmetry
in varying degrees in each of these cases. The harms caused by potential
forfeiture of these deals because of breach demonstrated the adage, "The bigger
they are, the harder they fall"-or perhaps more aptly in a financial crisis, "Too
big to fail." 3 52 However, at the threshold of failure, their original entitlement
provides a spillover to another entitlement in the adjudication process: their
ability to rely on flexibility and innovation in the contract doctrine. Here, each of
these commercial claimants could make relatively convincing arguments to
expand existing excuse doctrine considering specific and profound changes in
market and economic conditions. Essentially, Cunningham is correct; unlike
residential borrowers, the difference in the Trump loan versus home financial
loans is scale.35 3 The same could be said about the transactions in ALCOA and
Hoosier Energy. In court proceedings, the financial size of these agreements
entitled the breaching parties to creative and innovative ways to use the contract
doctrine for excuse and relief What this illustration shows is that during the
Great Recession, large commercial contracts, such as those involved in Hoosier
Energy and Trump, seemed to have an edge on something that the individual
homeowner defaulting on her residential mortgage in 2008 likely did not have.
The spillover here is demonstrated by the way in which one entitlement, that the
borrowers in Hoosier Energy and Trump had, to sophisticated commercial
350 Gretchen Morgenson, Just Call This Deal Hoosier Baroque, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 20, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/21gret.html (detailing that Hancock paid $300
million to Hoosier in the deal and Hoosier retained $20 million while giving the rest to Ambac).
351 See Geiger, et al., supra note 302 ("In 2005, the [Deutsche Bank] approved a $640 million
construction loan so Trump could build his name-sake tower in Chicago. The tower, with dozens
of multimillion-dollar condos, broke ground at the height of the real-estate boom. As the project
neared completion, the financial crisis hit, sending the global real-estate market crashing. And
when part of the loan came due, rather than pay it, Trump sued a lending consortium led by
Deutsche Bank for $3 billion.").
352 Scholarly examples of the use of the phrase to describe events in the financial crisis abound in
the literature. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and
the Need to Restructure the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698 (2006); Alison
M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate "Too Big to Fail" Non-Bank
Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829 (2010).
353 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 85.
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contracts consequently accessed another entitlement, the flexibility and
innovation in contract excuse doctrine. Whereas the parties to commercial
contracts in Hoosier Energy and Trump could try to argue that the Great
Recession made their nonperformance impracticable and thus excusable, the
homeowner facing default and foreclosure appeared to have less of an advantage
in making that argument. The homeowner was stuck with formalism and the strict
enforcement of their mortgage contracts. She could not have bought her way to
innovation and flexibility in contracts to keep her home loans afloat during that
financial tsunami. Meanwhile, Hoosier Energy and Trump seemed figuratively to
have managed to survive on what expensive houseboat money could afford.
B. Cumulative Externality
What does this disparity signify? Viewing the situation from both a
contractual vantage and on the interpersonal one, any significance is minimal if
the comparison is only between what one defaulting homeowner could not get
away with in terms of flexibility in light of what a commercial party, like Hoosier
Energy or Trump-or even ALCOA-could in a severe economic downturn. On
that narrow level, strict enforcement and absolute liability seem to make sense in
the homeowner's default situation. Invoking pact sunt servanda would be the
predictable thing to do in a defaulting situation. A deal's a deal. Whereas any of
the three excuse cases from Part III would share less resemblance with the case of
a defaulting homeowner because of the nature and size of the category of the
transactions.
When this illustration emphasizes the Great Recession as the articulated
reason for breach in the case of Hoosier Energy, Trump, and the individual
homeowner-or a severe change in economic and market conditions for
ALCOA-some commonality is established. Nevertheless, not much meaning
results if it merely involves one homeowner who is shut out of the type of excuse
defense that the commercial parties in breach could conversely access. That
sentiment would derive naturally from knowing that there are certain moral
considerations that contract law has often dodged in its modem treatment. For
instance, some developments in contract law tend to evade considerations of
constraint and altruism in furtherance of advancing self-interest to the fullest.3 5 4
Modem contract law's tendencies to help parties skew away from such
considerations were, according to Chunlin Leonard, part of contract law's role in
the Great Recession:
[C]ontract law played an enabling, albeit hidden, role in the
subprime mortgage crisis. Contract law facilitated the subprime
354 See, e.g., Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the Duty of
Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 621, 622 (2011).
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mortgage crisis in two ways. First, contract law's laissez faire
paradigm has incentivized contractual parties to pursue their self-
interests while failing to provide any constraint on excessive
pursuit of self-interests. Second, the current contract law
paradigm has also contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis by
having nurtured a business culture of everyone for themselves.355
Subscribing to contract law's ability to encourage self-interested maximization
leads to a willingness to accept that contract law obj ectifies such maximization in
every promised agreement-thus, creating its own peculiar morality. This would
justify disparities between different contracts by scope and nature of the
transaction.35 6 Under this approach, the individual homeowner's mortgage default
case would take lower priority or significance compared to the juggemaut
breaches represented by Hoosier Energy, Trump, and ALCOA.
So if this dominating perspective does not bring about any resonance in
the comparisons between the individual homeowner in breach of her residential
mortgage contract during the Great Recession and the commercial parties, like
Hoosier Energy and Trump who were advantageously relying on the Great
Recession to excuse their breach, what could possibly elevate any critical and
meaningful scrutiny regarding the inflexibility of contract law in home mortgage
contracts during this economic downturn? How do we make this comparison
more compelling as an indictment that such different results for flexibility matter
in our modem-day contract law system?
Perhaps the approach involves externalities. First, it can be understood
that the likely formalistic application of contract enforcement upon the single
homeowner in default during the Great Recession versus the spillover access to
innovation and flexibility in contracts in the large financial and commercial cases
during the same time reveal externalities based on the scale of the transactions. In
Hoosier Energy and Trump, the capability to argue and use the Great Recession
as a reason for excuse seems like it would be a positive externality because
merely having access to flexibility seemed to have benefitted both Hoosier
Energy and Trump respectively. Conversely, the small likelihood that an
individual homeowner's defense to default could have utilized the Great
Recession to begin with would be an externality in a negative sense because the
scale and nature of the contract probably foreclosed success on this strategy.
355 Id. at 622 (footnote omitted).
356 See id. ("Contract law's failure to provide any checks and balances stems from its hands-off
approach, built upon unwarranted assumptions of rational parties acting on their own behalf and
bargaining at arms' length to maximize their own expected utility."); see also id. ("Contract law's
general tolerance of parties' single-minded pursuit of self-interest has led to a "moral deficit.")
(referencing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD EcoNOMY 278 (2010)).
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Couching the results between non-performance in commercial and non-
commercial residential contracts as externalities focuses less on the formalist and
the self-interested maximization approaches that would not acknowledge any
insightful disparity.
But that still leaves the question of scale. In a sense, superficially, this
mentioning of scale revives Cunningham's remark about the differences between
mortgage borrowers and Trump's construction loan.35 7 His reference to scale was
directed to the money involved in these respective transactions: "Banks compete
vigorously to get Trump's billions in business; they care proportionately less
about individual loans in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, banks have
an incentive to settle their dispute with him and permit a change in his payment
schedule."35 8 Cunningham was emphasizing the financial investment of a
residential mortgage versus the size of the Deutsche Bank loan that Trump
executed and then later defaulted on. On that narrow comparison, the perspective
on disparity is small and justifiable on what Leonhard had observed about
contract law's immediate tendencies.
Perhaps however, in terms of scale, if the externalities are added to
Cunningham's comparison via scale, we finally get to some sort of significant
societal meaning. Comparing just the Trump contract to one homeowner contract
might be misleading. After all, the Great Recession was not merely predicated
upon a housing crisis based on a single homeowner default tied to one subprime
mortgage loan. It was en masse. In this way, the disparity in positive and negative
externalities does not merely exist between these commercial cases and the
individual homeowner. More correctly, scale needs to be brought in and the
comparison ought to be viewed in terms of a wide national swath of residential
mortgage defaults, not just a single hypothetical one. Consequently, the resonance
of the negative externality in home mortgage contract defaults ought to arise from
a cumulative perspective. 359 It is not just one homeowner who likely was shut out
357 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 268, at 85.
358 Id.
359 Aditi Bagchi, Unequal Promises, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 467, 493 (2011). In a similar vein to the
inequality established in this article, Aditi Bagchi has established a similar concept of inequality
awareness through cumulative disparity of high to low experiences in other commercial contracts
based on the value and expectations of those contracts:
The disparity in the sense of entitlement that results from these diverging
experiences in the consumer marketplace is problematic because it affects not
just any of the primary goods utilized by individuals in their pursuit of the good
life, but one of the most fundamental of the primary goods: individuals' sense
of self. It is of greater concern than disparities in other resources that might be
useful in the pursuit of one's conception of the good because sense of self
motivates the formation of such a conception.
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from such flexibility and innovation in contract doctrine, but a widespread group
of affected homeowners in the U.S. at the time.
When viewed as a cumulative externality, the disparity here between the
Hoosier Energies and Trumps of the world, who could better access flexibility to
defend their breaches, and defaulting homeowners, who could not, hopefully
become more significant. It makes more stinging Donald Trump's personal
interview statement about why he ought to be excused from his construction loan,
but not any buyers of his condominiums who might contemporaneously have
suffered difficulties repaying their loans when we view the disparity as a
cumulative externality. It stirs up an awareness of inequality that our contracts
system and the adherence to formalism had produced against U.S. homebuyers in
comparison to commercial parties and the flexibility afforded to their contracts of
scale.
C Inequality Awareness
In light of the cumulative externality and the ensuing inequality
awareness reached in the previous subsection regarding disparities between
treatment of home mortgage contracts and commercial contracts, Cohen's
reflection that failed contracts were at the crux of the housing crisis stands more
critically as a synecdoche for the failure of contracting both before and after the
global economic crisis.360 Other commentators on the 2008 housing crisis have
remarked that "[flor its part, contract law strips emotion out of contracts and
chooses abstraction instead"3 61 and this tendency was seemingly externalized into
the types of arms-length contracting behavior in home loan transactions that
contributed to such prevalent failure that precipitated the housing crisis. 3 62 But it
is at the point of failure that the ideas and assumptions are challenged and often
fine-tuned. The inequality awareness brought by viewing, as a cumulative
externality, the improbability of defaulting home loan borrowers to rely on
excuse defenses based on hardships caused by the Great Recession - while the
opposite was true of parties in large commercial contracts - illustrates a
dysfunction of modem contract law for some of the societal purposes it serves.
Without normative critique here in light of how contract law would deal
with another future crisis, this cumulative externality leaves unresolved some
further observations that the rigidity and formalism in contract enforcement
Id. This article has applied Bagchi's approach to viewing contract inequality based on disparities
on a cumulative level to the enforcement of contracts, residential versus commercial, in the Great
Recession.
360 See Cohen, supra note 29, at 2-3.
361 Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O'Byrne, Law, Emotion, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 29
GPSoLo 1, at 66 (2012).
362 See id.
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during the Great Recession led to some severe injustice, and not merely on the
financial front. First, one could interpret that the cumulative externality, involving
tens of thousands of mortgage defaults and foreclosures on single family homes,
is an indictment upon an entire class of homebuyers on their contractual
worthiness. This inference is possible because, for whatever economic or
financial reason, they took risks in bargaining within the subprime and alternative
mortgage options available when purchasing homes and later when the housing
bubble burst, they were not able to hold up their ends of the bargain. They could
not compete within a system in which lenders were much more sophisticated at
the outset and commercial parties, such as Hoosier Energy, Trump, and ALCOA,
had abilities to use flexibility by pointing to economic downturns to achieve some
relief Crudely put, contract law treats parties unequally and, in this case,
condemns those who are subsequently unable to abide by their contracts because
they cannot argue flexibly to defend them from foreclosures.
A related premise that has been discussed numerously - and especially
within a subset of defaulting borrowers, who strategically defaulted and "walked
away" from their underwater home mortgages - has been the immoral and
opportunistic take on these particular homeowners for breaching their promises
and obligations because the Great Recession made it financially and equitably
onerous, even though they could have stayed in. Brent White crystallized the
debate in a series of scholarly articles shortly after the Great Recession: the push-
pull between formalist justifications based on morality of promises, economic
maximization arguments, and risk allocations again signal the problems arising
from the societal resonance we can extrapolate on modem contracting. The
debate informed not just the failure of contracting, but also the pluralist meanings
in modem contracts. The morality angle could also apply to homeowners who,
unlike strategic defaulters, had no choice but to default on their loan repayments.
Comparatively, it has a less opportunistic connotation on these defaulting
borrowers and may focus on the risks they voluntarily took in securing financing,
but nevertheless, a negative sting on their contractual worthiness still exists.
More profoundly, the inequality awareness gathered from this cumulative
externality also could deepen the sense of indignity upon defaulting borrowers,
beyond contractual unworthiness, that directly undermines their collective and
individual self-worth. This interpretation alone is a consequence of overstating
the above conclusion regarding contractual unworthiness. However, that
overstatement can be minimized and counterbalanced once the subject matter of
these mortgage contracts enters the observation: the single-family home. The
symbolism of American homeownership cannot be underscored more heavily as
an extension of personal wealth, status, and materialism for the individual,3 63 as
363 See Katherine M. Vail, Saving the American Dream: The Legalization of the Tiny House
Movement, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 357, 360-61 (2016) ("Once Americans embraced the idea of
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well as a representation of prosperity in the aggregate.364 That symbolism is part
of the American identity: "For American families, the desire to own a home is
'almost a genetic yearning . .. to claim and fence and demarcate our dwellings,
physically and legally, from others."' 36 5 It also tracks the historical narrative of
the United States: "Since the founding of the American colonies, homeownership
has been a predominant feature of the national psyche. Owning a home is the
American Dream, the predominant symbol of family prosperity and success." 3 6 6
All of this shares some alignment with property law theories on the notion of
homeownership and how it affects American ideas of citizenship with the rights
and entitlements involved: "This idea of homeownership has become so
entrenched in the American psyche that it has effectively become a 'presumed
right and privilege' and has 'embedded [itself] in the American
consciousness. "'367 For better or worse, whether morally or politically justified,
the sense of homeownership in America achieves respectability:
The assumption that homeowners are (much) better local citizens
dominates property theory and legal scholarship to date without
serious critique. The claimed "citizenship effects" of
homeownership comprise a constellation of positive externalities,
including local contribution and investment, political
participation, neighboring, and collective action, as well as gains
to prosperity and stability from industrious and content citizens.
There are two influential accounts of how homeownership
produces this breadth of citizenship benefits. In the first account,
homeownership is morally and psychologically transformative.
Ownership and the act of becoming an owner inculcate prosocial
behavior and "citizenship virtue," which generalizes across civic
and social behavior. In the second account, the investment stake
homeownership as a symbol of status and success in society, they began increasing the size of their
homes to further elevate their status.").
364 See THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEALTH
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 10 (2004) (notes how homeownership was braided together with the
sense of economic prosperity amongst the middle-class after World War II).
365 Heather K. Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 113, 126 (2009) (quoting Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, Examining the
Unexamined Goal, in LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 11
(2002)).
366 Id. (footnotes omitted).
367 Nathan Torok & Mark Torok, What Happened to the American Dream? An Analysis of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Its Effect on Home Ownership,
17 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REv. & SOC. JUST. 95, 97 (2015) (quoting Michael A. Stegman,
Joanna Brownstein, & Kenneth Tempkin, Home Ownership and Family Wealth in the United
States, in HOUSING AND FAMILY WEALTH: COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 86, 86
(Ray Forrest & Alan Murie eds., 1995)).
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in the owned home (and by some accounts the high-risk,
undiversified nature of that interest) motivate socially beneficial
local participation and contribution.3 68
Although dignity through respectability is problematic, 3 69 this idea of
homeownership has a dignifying effect that raises self-worth in the United States.
In this way,
[t]o fail to treat someone's home with the respect that it deserves
is to seriously insult their sense of dignity and self-worth. Far
more than they expect to be free from any state interference in
their use and enjoyment of their homes, people expect their homes
and their homeownership to be treated with the respect and
dignity appropriate to the significance it has in their lives.370
Not to mention that a home provides shelter - a fundamental necessity - which
alone carries with it dignity issues if it is denied to an individual.3 7 1
The decline in certain cities and neighborhoods - with foreclosed homes
resulting from the Great Recession - is an embodiment of all of this societal
indignity in light of the cumulative externality resulting, in part, from the harsh
rigidity of contracts. Compared to the flexibility and innovation that commercial
contracts permit parties, the formalist approach to contract doctrine in residential
mortgage contracts during that time seems to be complicit in two endeavors.
First, it replicates an existing hierarchy animated by values that inherently cherish
wealth maximization as both its teleological good and as its means of mobility
368 Stephanie M. Stem, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
890, 890-91 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
369 See generally Jeremiah A. Ho, Find Out What It Means to Me: The Politics of Respect and
Dignity in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 463 (2017) (arguing that
respectability is a problematic means of obtaining dignity and leveraging for full sexual orientation
antidiscrimination after the marriage equality cases at the Supreme Court).
370 Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle,
74 FORDHAML. REV. 2971, 2975 (2006).
371 Human rights rhetoric has recognized that there is a right to shelter this intertwined with
human dignity. For instance, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event
of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Art. 25 U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (emphasis added).
In addition, "[r]eferences to human dignity and social progress permeated the UDHR, but the most
explicit proclamations of economic and social rights can be found in Articles 22 through 26.
Katherine Barrett Wiik, Justice for America's Homeless Children: Cultivating A Child's Right to
Shelter in the United States, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 875, 918 (2009).
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along the striations of that hierarchy. We see this in the wealth of the parties
involved in ALCOA, Hoosier Energy, and Trump. We also see this perhaps in the
commercial purposes of the transactions of ALCOA, Hoosier Energy, and Trump
as opposed to the goal of the average mortgage agreement: to finance the
purchase of a single-family home. Secondly, contract law seems to discriminate
between these different classes of contracts - and, correspondingly, parties -
certain flexibilities and innovations are allowed for one "higher" category of
transactions, but not another. The entitlement spillovers of the commercial
contracts would underscore and elucidate that hierarchy. Moreover, the
cumulative externalities created by the spillovers would reveal where the
discrimination results - upon the dignity of the homeowners. In the wreckage of
the housing crisis, what the shards and broken material tell us about contract law
is the extent it facilitated inequality in the lives of those who subscribed to home
buying and used contracts to finance their purchases.
D. Contract Pluralism
If contract law is helpful to us, then it ought to be instrumental in helping
us pursue that conception of the good. In some ways, contract law accomplished
this in the years that created the housing bubble in the United States. As we have
observed, contract law was part of homeownership; it facilitated transfer of title
and helped finance home purchases. But the innovative and risky ways it did so in
the fine print not only helped contribute to a falsity about housing prices
nationwide, it also led to financial abuse premised on the materialistic attraction
of home-buying. The unbridled innovations utilized in drafting mortgage
agreements eventually subverted a genuine ability for people to engage in
pursuing a common and symbolic good. It was invariably unjust. And when the
bubble burst, contract law and formalism denied homeowners the ability to
resolve their situations, while those who had entitlements to flexibility had the
possibility to revise their predicaments. Unsurprisingly then, along this narrative,
contract law brought about the ominous greatness of the Great Recession.
Perhaps normatively we ought to be skeptical about strict formalism and
embrace some more workable approaches to contract law. Formalism has its
virtues in the application of contract rules. Yet, if practiced too legalistically and
universally, certain unjust situations - as this Article has attempted to
demonstrate - may cause larger societal harm than personal harm. Flexibility in
the enforcement of contracts allows for the ability to address global catastrophes
and sustain an appropriate level of contract justice. Otherwise, our contracts
system does not really value the personal and the humane; it values ideas, such as
wealth accumulation, and has been commandeered by neo-liberalist virtues.
To arrive at a more meaningful contractual approach that could have
regulated or avoided cumulative externalities that were socially and economically
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unequal, we must acknowledge the connection between home buying and
contracts. The cultural and material significance of homeownership as part of the
American Dream reflects a national identity to which many U.S. homebuyers
generally subscribe. That image of homeownership as being "American" is so
strong that one can view the act of pursuing homeownership as a type of self-
determination or self-authorship. This role of homeownership as part of an
individual's self-authorship within a collective, cultural identity resembles what
political theorists might call a "cultural right."3 7 2 Thus, home buying is not just
about purchasing a dwelling, it is part of self-invention; indeed, an act that people
collectively in this country consider "all-American." As Eric Mitnick has noted,
"one of the principal ways in which individuals define themselves is through
social attachments."3 73 As such, there is self-authorship in the act of buying a
home, if doing so allows one to access that American identity and status. From
the standpoint of theorists who highly regard individual autonomy as a driving
force in liberalism, self-authorship - as Mitnick also notes - is one of
liberalism's central commitments.374 In particular, self-authorship is part of an
individual's constitutive autonomy.375 In this way, "insofar as membership in a
particular cultural group may constitute an aspect of identity, rights that respect
such cultural attachments serve rather directly to protect crucial individual
interests." 37 6 That process is more complicated than it reads because "liberal
theorists envision even constitutive ends and attachments as subject to critical
reflection and revision."377
If indeed homeownership - as part of the American Dream concept - is
one way in which individuals in the United States engage in self-authorship, then
both culturally and individually, "contract [law] is a vehicle for individual self-
determination. "378 It facilitates the fulfilment of cultural rights and self-
determination partly through the voluntary freedom of contracting that has been
classically recognized in our system. But with the addition of home buying as
culturally significant to one's membership in the American national identity,
contract law can also further one's constitutive autonomy if that voluntariness
then accesses self-authorship. Hence, contractual autonomy is not just about
freedom; for one's identity, it can also possess a constitutive function.
372 Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1635, 1640-41 (2003).
373 Id. at 1638 ("[C]ultural rights merely vest on the basis of cultural membership, and most such
rights (for example, language rights, rights freely to practice one's religion) vest legally in
individuals rather than in any collective entity.") (footnote omitted).
374 Id. at 1640.
375 Id. at 1641.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Bertram Lomfeld & Dan Wielsch, The Public Dimension of Contract: Contractual Pluralism
Beyond Privity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2013, at i, iv.
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As we have seen, however, the process of formalism in contract
enforcement can also subordinate autonomy when contracts fail. That might be
acceptable or tolerable if all contracts during the Great Recession had been
subordinated in this way. However, Hoosier Energy (and Donald Trump)
sustained the ability to salvage efficiency through excuse while defaulting
homebuyers could not. The utility of contract law and doctrine thus ought to have
potential beyond arms-length transactions. Perhaps a strict adherence to contract
formalism then actually stifles and paternalizes contract law from its potential.
To rectify this tension, courts would have to first recognize inequality as
well as constitutive autonomy in the context of such home purchase and finance
transactions. In doing so, courts would thus highlight the cultural significance of
home buying and perhaps underscore residential mortgage contracts as part of
self-authorship. After those initial steps, courts could then better see that the
process of contract enforcement can overburden the autonomy of homebuyers
unfairly - especially when comparing defaulting homeowners to Hoosier
Energy's successful impracticability defense based on the Great Recession.
Perhaps that comparison would make the equitable argument for flexibility and
lead to a more just and redemptive place if constitutive autonomy indeed allows
for self-authorship and revision.
After recognizing constitutive autonomy in home buying, courts could
add another layer of reasoning against strict formalism by using contractual
pluralism to reach a more flexible result. Courts ought to approach pluralism in
contracts more readily by acknowledging that there is no unifying theory of
contract law. Instead, contract law is and has always been dialectical in nature.3 79
In this way, courts could adopt pluralism to engage in more flexible decision-
making. According to Leon Trakman,
[p]luralist theories of contracting do not endorse a "super" value,
but instead acknowledge a plurality of values that are
commensurable or incommensurable with one another according
to the contractual context. Decision agents-typically courts-use
that pluralism to identify and rank the intensity of plural
preferences and apply them through a process of practical reason
in order to reach prudential decisions about the formation of
contracts.38 0
379 Emily M.S. Houh, Sketches of A Redemptive Theory of Contract, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 959
(2015).
380 Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (2010); see id. at
1034 ("For example, judges rank values like liberty to contract and equality in contracting on a
ranking scale in which they pay due cognizance to continuing and discontinuing moral, political
and cultural values. They analyze those values through a process of practical reason through which
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Meredith Miller echoes this sentiment that pluralism recognizes competing values
and that contract law is not normatively or descriptively regarded by adherence to
one value.38 1 With the dominance of formalism, she notes that one consequential
issue is that it "elevates the content of the parties' written contract (its form) over
any concerns for normative values or societal notions of fairness."38 2 Using a
form of pluralism, courts then could rely on context to achieve a situation in
which competing values allow flexibility for both commercial agreements and
residential mortgage contracts. In relaying one method of plurality theorized by
Ethan Leib, Miller notes a fallacy Leib observed - that dominating single
theories of contract usually fail in their attempts to articulate a unifying contract
theory, and instead they often exclude or "box out" certain subcategories of
contracts.38 3 But an approach steeped in contractual pluralism would find that
"these sub-categorizations could be used as a way to pnioritize competing
principles. For example, contracts between organizations would be governed by
efficiency over autonomy concerns. Contracts between individuals would be
governed by autonomy principles before efficiency concerns." 3 84 Pluralism could
have separated Hoosier Energy and Trump from residential homeowners, but
would also raise the importance of residential home loan contracts for flexible
resolutions based on autonomy in a large financial crisis.
After all, the dialectical nature of contract law leads to the realization that
contracts "should not be viewed in absolute terms, as only formalistic or only
equitable." 38 5 Rather, contract law "should provide both a degree of certainness
and predictability, as well as a degree of fairness and justice. There is room in
contract law for objectivism, subjectivism, economic efficiency, and community
standards of fair and just practices.",386 This kind of broad conception of contract
law is what ultimately led scholars such as Bertram Lomfeld and Dan Wielsch to
exclaim that "[c]ontract is the legal heart of social pluralism." 38 7 By valuing
certain competing norms over others in the context of contract breaches during
the Great Recession and inequality awareness, courts would have to realize that
the practice of not addressing excuse for a vast majority of individual
homeowners sustained that inequality. Thus, pluralism could have assisted in
they assimilate competing and supporting propositions in arriving at preferred determinations
about the formation of a contract.") (footnotes omitted)).
381 Meredith R. Miller, Party Sophistication and Value Pluralism in Contract, 29 TOURO L. REV.
659, 662 (2013).
382 Id. at 664-65.
383 Id. at 670 (noting Leib's point that "theories that 'box out' entire types of contracts fail to offer
a general theory of contracts").
384 Id. (footnotes omitted).
385 Houh, supra note 379, at 959.
386 Id.
387 Lomfeld & Wielsch, supra note 378, at ii.
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accessing flexibility - and should in future circumstances of contractual
inequality.
Applied this way, courts could have maintained the importance of
contracts as self-authorship in the context of homeownership and equitably
addressed mortgage arrangements that ended badly in the Great Recession.
Courts would then have realized that the inequality of not addressing excuse for
residential home loan defaults is more harmful once people's dignity and
autonomy are involved. Using pluralism, such values could be held in the same
importance as the scale and values of efficiency that propelled commercial
agreements during that time. After all, constitutive autonomy and self-authorship
would seem to imply that there is room in contracts for revision.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the mortgage default context, the inequality awareness this Article
observes will hopefully bring more weight to the normative solutions that Miller,
Cohen, and others have proposed to allow changed market conditions to broaden
the use of contract excuse doctrines. These solutions may provide an exception or
a clearer opportunity for some equitable considerations to be permitted to
homeowners as well as the Hoosier Energy, Trump, and ALCOA-like giants of
commercial agreements.3 88 More broadly, the inequality awareness this Article
observes should also direct attention and critical scrutiny to pondering what
future circumstances might hold for the present state of contract doctrines,
especially in large catastrophes of its own making.
The more we move away from focusing on the mere ideas that contract
law ought to embrace and shift to theorizing contract law's ability to further self-
realization, the closer we will be to arriving at a contracting system that not only
recognizes human failure and failings but also addresses them justly,
provides appropriate redemptive opportunities that self-authorship affords, and
highlights the beliefs that modem liberal societies hold. We live by contracts. So
rather than having been a homewrecker of sorts, perhaps contracts, during the
Great Recession, could have emphasized the humans living inside these homes.
388 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35, at 42.
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